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Abstract
This paper studies optimal mortgage design. A borrower (a household) with limited liability needs
nancial support from a lender (a big nancial institution) to purchase a home. We characterize the
optimal allocation in a continuous time setting in which (i) the borrowers income is volatile and its
realization is unobservable to the lender, (ii) the lender has a right to costly foreclose the loan and
seize the house, (iii) the borrowers intertemporal consumption preferences are represented by a constant
discount factor, (iv) the lender discounts cash ows using a stochastic discount factor that depends
on the market interest rate. We show that the optimal allocation can be implemented using either a
combination of an interest only mortgage with a home equity line of credit or an option adjustable rate
mortgage. Under the optimal contracts, mortgage payments and default rates are higher when the market
interest rate is high. However, borrowers benet from low mortgage payments and low default rates when
the market interest rate is low. Thus, our analysis provides theoretical evidence that these alternative
mortgages, which have recently generated great controversy, can benet both lenders and borrowers.
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1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a rapid growth in originations of more sophisticated alternative mortgage prod-
ucts (AMPs), such as option adjustable rate mortgages (option ARMs) and interest only mortgages. In the
United States, from 2003 through 2005, the originations of AMPs grew from less than 10% of residential
mortgage originations to about 30%.1 As of the rst half of 2006, 37%2 of mortgage originations were AMPs.
Option adjustable rate mortgages experienced particularly fast growth. They accounted for as little as 0.5%
of all mortgages written in 2003, but their share soared to at least 12.3% through the rst ve months of
2006.3 As AMPs have complemented other forms of housing loans rather than replaced them, these nontra-
ditional mortgages account for a signicant part of the recent increase in household mortgage debt in the
United States, from about 60% of GDP in 2003 to above 75% of GDP in 2006.4
Unlike traditional xed rate mortgages (FRMs) and adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs), AMPs let bor-
rowers pay only the interest portion of the debt or even less than that, while the loan balance can grow above
the amount borrowed initially. Often, these mortgages carry teaser rates and come with a second mortgage,
taking the form of a home equity line of credit (HELOC). Interest rates on such loans can increase as interest
rates in the economy move higher. As a result of their popularity and the associated increase in the U.S.
household debt, AMPs have generated great controversy and criticism. Critics contend that AMPs can hurt
borrowers with high interest payments in the future.5 On the other hand, proponents say that AMPs allow
both lenders and borrowers to manage their cash ows intelligently.
Surprisingly, despite of the economic signicance of AMPs and the extent of the surrounding controversy,
there has so far been no attempt to formally address whether these new mortgages improve benets to
borrowers and lenders relative to traditional mortgages. In this paper, we formally address this question
by formulating a general problem of nding the best possible contract between a home buyer and a bank.
Instead of considering a particular class of mortgages, we derive an optimal mortgage contract as a solution
to a general dynamic contracting problem in a setting with as few assumptions as possible about payments
between the borrower and the lender and about circumstances under which the home is repossessed. Then
we examine whether features of existing mortgage contracts are consistent with the properties of the best
possible contract.
Specically, we consider a continuous-time setting in which a risk-neutral borrower with limited liability
needs outside nancial support from a risk-neutral lender in order to purchase a home. Home ownership
generates for the borrower a public and deterministic utility stream. While the distribution of the borrowers
disposable income is publicly known, its realizations are privately observable by him. There is a liquidation
1United States Government Accountability O¢ ce (2006).
2 Inside Mortgage Finance (2006a).
3Data from LoanPerformance, an industry tracker unit of First American Real Estate Solutions (FARES).
4The mortgage debt data are from Flow of Funds Accounts of the United States, Federal Reserve Board, and the GDP data
are from Bureau of Economic Analysis.
5See for example Department of the Treasury, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, National Credit Union Administration (2006), or United States Government Accountability O¢ ce (2006).
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technology that allows termination of the relationship and transfer of the home to the lender. This transfer
of ownership leads to ine¢ ciencies due to associated dead-weight costs. The focus on a risk neutral setup
allows us to abstract from any possible insurance role of mortgages and to focus entirely on the fundamental
feature of the borrowing-lending relationship with collateral, which is how to e¢ ciently provide a borrower
with incentives to repay his debt using a costly liquidation.
An important assumption of our model is that the borrower and the lender have di¤erent discount
rates. The borrowers discount rate  represents his intertemporal consumption preferences and is constant
over time. On the other hand, the lender, a big nancial institution, discounts cash ows using a stochastic
discount rate rt that depends on the market interest rate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the rst paper
that allows for a stochastic interest rate in an optimal dynamic security design setting. We further assume
that rt follows a two-state Markov process and is smaller than the borrowers discount rate. We assume
that the borrower is more impatient than the lender reecting that a borrowing-constrained household has
a higher intertemporal marginal rate of substitution then a nancial institution.
An allocation in this environment obligates the borrower to report his disposable income. The allocation
species transfers between the borrower and the lender, conditional on the history of the borrowers reports
and the circumstances under which the lender would foreclose the loan and seize the home. Although the
borrowers reports cannot be veried, the threat of losing ownership of the home induces the borrower to
pay his debt.
We characterize the optimal allocation using the borrowers continuation payo¤at and the market interest
rate rt as state variables. Under the optimal allocation, the borrower truthfully reports his income. The
home is repossessed when the borrowers continuation payo¤ at hits the borrowers reservation utility A
for the rst time. The borrower consumes part of his income whenever at reaches the upper boundary
a1 (rt). When at 2 [A; a1 (rt)], all the income of the borrower is transferred to the lender. The borrowers
continuation payo¤ increases (decreases) when his income realization is high (low).
Interestingly, when the interest rate rt switches from high to low, the borrowers continuation payo¤
jumps up. On the other hand, when the interest rate rt switches from low to high, the borrowers continu-
ation payo¤ jumps down, which can trigger immediate bankruptcy. This is optimal because the stream of
borrowers payments is more valuable for the lender when the interest rate is low. As a result, the chances of
home repossession are reduced by moving the borrowers continuation payo¤ further away from the default
boundary A when the interest rate switches to low. However, the threat of repossession must be real enough
in order for the borrower to share his income with the lender. As a result, the optimal allocation increases
the chances of repossession when the interest rate is high in order to compensate for the weakened threat of
repossession in the low state. This is done by moving the borrowers continuation payo¤ closer to the default
boundary A when the interest rate switches to high.
After characterizing the optimal allocation in terms of the continuation payo¤s of the borrower and the
lender, we examine whether features of existing mortgage contracts are consistent with the properties of
3
optimal allocation. We nd that the optimal allocation can be implemented in three di¤erent ways using
combinations of existing residential mortgage instruments. First, it can be implemented using an interest
only mortgage with HELOC and two way balance adjustment. Second, it can be implemented using an
interest only mortgage with HELOC with a preferential rate and one way balance adjustment. Third, it can
be implemented using an option adjustable rate mortgage with a preferential interest rate. Therefore, our
analysis provides theoretical evidence that the alternative mortgage products can be e¢ ciently utilized to
mitigate agency cost in the stochastic interest rate environment.
Under the interest only mortgage with HELOC and two way balance adjustment, the borrower owns a
home, while being obligated to make interest coupon payments on the interest only mortgage and interest
payments on the home equity credit line balance. The parameters of HELOC are reset every time the
market interest rate changes. When the market interest rate switches from high to low, the balance on
HELOC is automatically reduced by an amount proportional to the outstanding balance and the interest
rate charged on HELOC balance is also reduced. On the contrary, the balance and the HELOC interest rate
are automatically increased when the market interest rate switches from low to high. The borrower uses his
disposable income to make the current interest rate payments on the interest only mortgage and to repay
the HELOC balance. When the disposable income realization is low, the borrower can draw on the credit
line to make the current debt payments, as long as he does not exceed the credit limit. The borrower is in
default if he is unable to make mortgage payments without exceeding the HELOC credit limit. In this case,
the lender forecloses the loan and seizes ownership of the home.
Although mortgages with HELOC and two way balance adjustment are interesting from a theoretical
point of view, we do not yet observe them in practice. While we actually observe reductions of mortgage debt
balance in the form of "cramdown"6 provisions, the unusual feature of these mortgages is their automatic
increase in debt balance in response to a market interest rate increase. The implementation using the interest
only mortgage with HELOC with a preferential rate and one way balance adjustment addresses this issue.
The interest only mortgage with HELOC with a preferential rate and one way balance adjustment is
similar to the interest only mortgage with HELOC and two way balance adjustment, except that a part
of the HELOC balance is subject to a low preferential (teaser) rate and balance adjustment occurs only
when the interest rate changes from high to low. This reduction in debt can be interpreted as an automatic
"cramdown" provision to be applicable whenever the market interest rate switches to low. When the interest
rate changes from low to high, the total amount of the HELOC debt does not change. Instead, the balance
subject to the preferential rate shrinks.
The option ARM mortgage charges a low preferential interest rate on a portion of the balance. On the
remaining part of the balance, a variable rate is charged which positively correlates with the market interest
rate. The balance subject to the preferential rate increases when the interest rate switches from high to low
6"Cramdown" is a court-ordered reduction of the secured balance due on a home mortgage loan, granted to a homeowner
who has led for personal bankruptcy protection.
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and decreases when the interest rate switches from low to high. Unlike the previous two implementations,
here the interest rate changes do not a¤ect the total balance on the loan.
All three optimal mortgage implementations provide nancial exibility for the borrower to cover possible
low income realizations. Given the interest only mortgage with HELOC and two way (or one way) balance
adjustment, the borrower can draw on HELOC up to its limit, whenever his income is not su¢ cient to
make the coupon payment. Under the option ARM, there is no minimum payment requirement  a low
payment from the borrower translates into a higher balance, as long as the balance does not exceed the
negative amortization limit. Although home repossession is costly, the borrower does not need to maintain
precautionary savings, because the credit commitments by the lender provide a safety net.
The parametrized examples we consider indicate substantial e¢ ciency gains from using mortgage con-
tracts that are contingent on the realization of the lenders interest rate, such as the optimal option ARM or
the interest only mortgage with HELOC, compared to contracts that do not depend on the lenders interest
rate. These examples also show that the e¢ ciency gains are largest for households that make little or no
downpayment.
Critics of alternative mortgage products point out that AMPs seem to be more protable for lenders
than traditional mortgages. They conclude that AMPs allow lenders to proteer at the expense of home-
owners. However, this paper shows that the properties of AMPs are consistent with the properties of the
optimal allocation governing the relationship between the borrower and the lender, which represents a Pareto
improvement over traditional mortgages. As a consequence, it is possible that both lenders and borrowers
benet from AMPs. Critics of AMPs have also raised concerns that teaser rates and low minimum payments
can result in substantially higher mortgage payments and, as a consequence, higher default rates when in-
terest rates in the economy increase. Nevertheless, this paper demonstrates that this possibility does not
necessarily contradict optimality of AMPs. Under the optimal mortgage contract, mortgage payments and
default rates are indeed higher when the market interest rate is high. However, borrowers benet from low
mortgage payments and low default rates when the interest rate is low.
Related Literature
This paper belongs to the growing literature on dynamic optimal security design, which is a part of
the literature on dynamic optimal contracting models using recursive techniques that began with Green
(1987), Spear and Srivastava (1987), Abreu, Pearce and Stacchetti (1990), Phelan and Townsend (1991),
among many others. Sannikov (2006a) developed continuous-time techniques for a principal-agent problem.
The two studies that are most closely related to ours are DeMarzo and Fishman (2004) and its continuous-
time formulation by DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006). These papers study long-term nancial contracting in a
setting with privately observed cash ows, and show that the implementation of the optimal contract involves
a credit line with a constant interest rate and credit limit, long-term debt, and equity. Biais et al. (2006)
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study the optimal contract in a stationary version of DeMarzo and Fishmans (2004) model and show that
its continuous time limit exactly matches DeMarzo and Sannikovs (2006) continuous-time characterization
of the optimal contract. Tchistyi (2006) considers a setting with correlated cash ows and shows that the
optimal contract can be implemented using a credit line with performance pricing. Sannikov (2006b) shows
that an adverse selection problem, due to the borrowers private knowledge concerning quality of a project
to be nanced, implies that, in the implementation of the optimal contract, a credit line has a growing
credit limit. Clementi and Hopenhayn (2006) and DeMarzo and Fishman (2006) o¤er theoretical analyses
of optimal investment and security design in moral hazard environments.
Unlike this paper, none of the above studies considers an environment with a stochastic discount rate. We
solve for the optimal allocation in the stochastic discount rate environment and nd that its implementation
involves a variable interest rate charged on the borrowers debt as well as balance adjustments, adjustable
preferential debt or a combination of both. On the technical side, building on the martingale techniques
developed for Lévy processes, we extend DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) characterization of the optimal
allocation in a continuous-time setting to a stochastic discount rate environment.
There is a sizeable real estate nance literature that addresses the design of mortgages in the presence
of asymmetric information between the borrower and lender. The bulk of this literature focuses on adverse
selection and how it a¤ects the menu of mortgages being o¤ered to borrowers with limited insurance possi-
bilities. Chari and Jagannathan (1989) consider a model with two private types of borrowers, who di¤er in
terms of the riskiness of their potential gains from selling the property, and show that the optimal contract
to be chosen by borrowers with larger potential gains involves contractual arrangements such as points7 and
prepayment penalties together with a "due-on-sale" clause. Brueckner (1994) develops a model in which
borrowers self-select into di¤erent loans, and shows that the optimal menu of mortgages will induce longer
term borrowers to select loans with higher points and a lower coupon. Unlike these two papers, LeRoy
(1996) considers a stochastic interest rate environment and nds that, when borrowers renance optimally,
if interest rates fall, the points/coupon choice can at best serve only to separate the least mobile borrower
type from all others. Stanton and Wallace (1998) show that in the presence of transaction costs payable by
borrowers on renancing, it is possible to construct a separating equilibrium in which borrowers with di¤ering
mobility select xed rate mortgages with di¤erent combinations of coupon rate and points. Posey and Yavas
(2001) study how borrowers with di¤erent private levels of default risk would self-select between xed rate
mortgages and adjustable rate mortgages, and show the unique equilibrium may be a separating equilibrium
in which the high-risk borrowers choose the adjustable rate mortgages, while low-risk borrowers select the
xed rate mortgages. Unlike these papers that focus on adverse selection, Dunn and Spatt (1985) consider
a two-period moral hazard model, where future income realization of borrowers are uncertain and private,
and show that the optimal mortgage would involve a due-on-sale clause. In terms of this literature, to our
7Points represents the amount paid either to maintain or lower the interest rate charged.
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knowledge, our paper is the rst study of optimal mortgage design in a dynamic moral hazard environment,
and the rst study that addresses the optimality of alternative mortgage products.
There is also a large literature that focuses on the choice of mortgage contracts and the risk associated
with them (for example, Campbell and Cocco (2003)). Unlike our paper, this literature takes a space of
contracts as exogenously given, and studies the household choice within this restricted set of contracts.
Another branch of research investigates limited participation models, where housing collateral insulates
households from labor income shocks. Lustig and Van Nieuwerburgh (2005) typies this approach.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the continuous-time setting of the model. Section
3 introduces the dynamic contracting model with a stochastic discount rate. Section 4 derives the optimal
contract. Section 5 presents the implementations of the optimal contract. Section 6 discusses the approximate
implementations of the optimal contract. Section 7 concludes.
2 Set-up
Time is continuous and innite. There is one borrower and one lender (or a group of lenders). The lender (a
big nancial institution) is risk neutral, has unlimited capital, and values a stochastic cumulative cash ow
fftg as
E
241Z
0
e Rtdft
35 ;
where Rt is the market interest rate at which the lender discounts cash ows that arrive at time t. We
assume that
Rt =
tZ
0
rsds;
where r is an instantaneous interest rate process, which takes values in the set frL; rHg, where 0 < rL < rH :
We assume that r is a continuous-time process adapted to N , where N = fNt;F1;t; 0  t <1g is a standard
compound Poisson process with the intensity (Nt) on a probability space (
1;F1;m1), such that for t  0 :
rt(Nt) =
8<: r0 if Nt is evenrc0 if Nt is odd ;
(Nt) =
8<: (r0) if Nt is even(rc0) if Nt is odd ;
where r0 2 frL; rHg is given, and rc0 = frL; rHg n fr0g : The above formulation implies that the interest rate
process is a rst-order time-invariant continuous Markov chain with an exponential distribution with the
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rate parameter (rt) of waiting times between successive changes. That is, for any t  0;
P [rt+s = rL for all s 2 [t; t+) jrt = rL ] = e (rL);
P [rt+s = rH for all s 2 [t; t+) jrt = rH ] = e (rH):
The borrower (a household) is also risk neutral, has limited wealth, and values a stochastic cumulative
consumption ow fCtg as
E
241Z
0
e tdCt
35 :
We assume that, for all t;   rt. The borrower can buy a home at date t = 0 at price P: At any moment
in time, ownership of the home generates to the borrower a public and deterministic instantaneous utility
equal to . The borrowers initial wealth is Y0  0. We assume that P > Y0, so that the borrower must
obtain funds from the lender to nance the purchase of a home.
A standard Brownian motion Z = fZt;F2;t; 0  t <1g on (
2;F2;m2) drives the borrowers disposable
income process, where fF2;t; 0  t <1g is an augmented ltration generated by the Brownian motion. The
borrowers disposable income up to time t, denoted by Yt, evolves according to
dYt = dt+ dZt; (1)
where  is the drift of the borrowers disposable income and  is the sensitivity of the borrowers income
to its Brownian motion component. The borrowers disposable income process, Y; is privately observed by
him. In addition, the borrower maintains a private savings account. The private savings account balance,
S, grows at the interest rate t; which is adapted to the process r, and is such that for all t; t  rt. The
borrower must maintain a non-negative balance at his account.
At any time, the relationship between the borrower and the lender can be terminated. In this case, the
lender receives L; while the borrower receives his reservation value equal to A. We assume that A   and
that
rHL+ A <  + ;
which ensures that the termination of the ongoing relationship is ine¢ cient.
Let (
;F ;m) := (
1  
2;F1 F2;m1 m2) be the product space of (
1;F1;m1) and (
2;F2;m2) :
3 Dynamic Moral Hazard Problem
At time 0, the funds needed to purchase the home in the amount of P   Y0 are transferred from the lender
to the borrower. An allocation, ( ; I); species a termination time of the relationship,  ; and the transfers
between the lender and the borrower that are based on the borrowers report of his income and the realized
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interest rate process. Let Y^ =
n
Y^t : t  0
o
be the borrowers report of his income, where Y^ is (Y; r)-
measurable. At any time 0  t   , the allocation transfers the reported amount, Y^t; from the borrower to
the lender, and It(Y^ ; r) from the lender to the borrower. Below we formally dene an allocation.
Denition 1 An allocation,  = ( ; I); species a termination time;  ; and transfers from the lender to the
borrower, I = fIt : 0  t  g ; that are based on Y^ and r. Formally,  is a (Y^ ; r)-measurable stopping time,
and I is a (Y^ ; r)-measurable continuous-time process, which is such that the process
E
24 Z
0
e sdIs jFt
35
is square-integrable for 0  t   and Y^ = Y:
The borrower can misreport his income. Consequently, under the allocation  = ( ; I); up to time t   ,
the borrower receives a total ow of income equal to
(dYt   dY^t)| {z }
misreporting
+ dIt;
and his private savings account balance, S, grows according to
dSt = tStdt+ (dYt   dY^t) + dIt   dCt; (2)
where dCt is the borrowers consumption at time t; which must be non-negative. We remember that, for all
t  0; St  0 and t  rt:
In response to an allocation ( ; I); the borrower chooses a feasible strategy that consists of his consumption
choice and the report of his income in order to maximize his expected utility. Below we formally dene the
feasible strategy of the borrower.
Denition 2 Given an allocation  = ( ; I); a feasible strategy for the borrower is a pair (C; Y^ ) such that
(i) Y^ is a continuous-time process adapted to (Y; r), and (Y   Y^ ) process is of bounded variation,
(ii) C is a nondecreasing continuous-time process adapted to (Y; r);
(iii) the savings process dened by (2) stays non-negative.
The borrowers strategy is incentive compatible if it maximizes his lifetime expected utility in the class
of all feasible strategies given an allocation  = ( ; I). As a result, we have the following denition.
Denition 3 Given an allocation  = ( ; I), the borrowers strategy (C; Y^ ) is incentive compatible if
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(i) given an allocation  = ( ; I); the borrowers strategy (C; Y^ ) is feasible,
(ii) given an allocation  = ( ; I); the borrowers strategy (C; Y^ ) provides him with the highest expected
utility among all feasible strategies, that is
E
24 Z
0
e t(dCt + dt) + e A jF0
35  E0
24 Z
0
e t(dC 0t + dt) + e
 A jF0
35
for all the borrowers feasible strategies (C 0; Y^ 0); given an allocation  = ( ; I):
The above denition does not explicitly include the participation constraint imposing the condition that
the borrowers utility from the continuation of the allocation should be at least as large as the borrowers
outside option, A; which he can receive at any time by quitting. As the borrower can always under-report
and steal at rate A until a termination time, any incentive compatible strategy would yield the borrower
utility of at least A.
The above denition of an incentive compatible strategy allows us to dene the incentive compatible
allocation as follows.
Denition 4 An incentive compatible allocation is an allocation  = ( ; I), together with the recommenda-
tion to the borrower, (C; Y^ ); where (C; Y^ ) is a borrowers incentive compatible strategy given an allocation
 = ( ; I).
The allocation is optimal if it provides the borrower with his initial promised utility a0 and maximizes the
expected prot of the lender in the class of all allocations that are incentive-compatible. Below we provide
a formal denition of the optimal allocation.
Denition 5 Given the promised payo¤ to the borrower, a0, an allocation  = (; I), together with a
recommendation to the borrower (C; Y^ ) is optimal if it maximizes the lenders expected utility (expected
prot):
E
24 Z
0
e Rt(dY^t   dIt) + e RL jF0
35
in the class of all incentive-compatible allocations that satisfy the following promise keeping constraint:
a0 = E
24 Z
0
e t(dCt + tdt) + e A jF0
35 :
In the following lemma, we show that searching for optimal allocations, we can restrict our attention to
allocations in which truth telling and zero savings are incentive compatible.
Lemma 1 There exists an optimal allocation in which the borrower chooses to tell the truth and maintains
zero savings.
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Proof In the Appendix.
The intuition for this result is straightforward. The rst part of the result is due to the direct-revelation
principle. The second part follows from the fact that it is weakly ine¢ cient for the borrower to save on his
private account (t  rt) as any such allocation can be improved by having the lender save and make direct
transfers to the borrower. Therefore, we can look for an optimal allocation in which truth telling and zero
savings are incentive compatible.
4 Derivation of the Optimal Allocation
In this subsection, we formulate recursively the dynamic moral hazard problem and determine the optimal
allocation. First, we consider a problem in which the borrower is not allowed to save and we determine the
optimal allocation8 in this environment. We know from Lemma 1 that it is su¢ cient to look for optimal
allocations in which the borrower reports truthfully and maintains zero savings, and so the optimal allocation
of the problem with no private savings, for a given promise to the borrower, yields to the lender at least as
much utility as the optimal allocation of the problem when the borrower is allowed to privately save. Finally,
we show that the optimal allocation of the problem with no private savings is fully incentive compatible,
even when the borrower can maintain undisclosed savings.
Methodologically, our approach is based on continuous-time techniques used by DeMarzo and Sannikov
(2006). We extend their techniques to a setting with Lévy processes. Appendix A.2 derives the optimal
allocation in a discrete-time version of our model.
4.1 The Optimal Allocation without Hidden Savings
Consider for a moment the dynamic moral hazard problem in which the borrower is not allowed to save.
First, we will nd a convenient state space for the recursive representation of this problem. For this purpose,
we dene the borrowers total expected utility received under the allocation  = ( ; I) conditional on his
information at time t, from transfers and termination utility, if he tells the truth:
Vt = E
24 Z
0
e s [dIs + ds] + e A jFt
35 :
Lemma 2 The process V = fVt;Ft; 0  t < g is a square-integrable Ft-martingale.
Proof follows directly from the denition of process V and the fact that this process is square-integrable,
which is implied by Denition 1.
8That is the allocation satisfying the properties of Denition 5 and the additional constraint that S = 0.
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Below is a convenient representation of the borrowers total expected utility received under the allocation
 = ( ; I) conditional on his information at time t, from transfers and termination utility, if he tells the
truth. Let M = fMt = Nt   t(Nt);F1;t; 0  t <1g be a compensated compound Poisson process.
Proposition 1 There exists Ft-predictable processes (;  ) = f(t;  t); 0  t  g such that
Vt = V0 +
Z t
0
e ssdZs +
Z t
0
e s sdMs =
V0 +
Z t
0
e ss

dYs   ds


| {z }
dZs
+
Z t
0
e s s(dNs   (Ns)ds): (3)
Proof We note that the couple (Z;N) is a Brownian-Poisson process, and it is an independent increment
process, which is a Lévy processes, on the space (
;F ;m): Then, Theorem III.4.34 in Jacod and Shiryaev
(2003) gives us the above martingale representation for a square-integrable martingale adapted to Ft taking
values in a nite dimensional space (the process V ).
According to the martingale representation (3), the total expected utility of the borrower under the
allocation  = ( ; I) and truth telling conditional on his information at time t equals its unconditional
expectation plus two terms that represent the accumulated e¤ect on the total utility of, respectively, the
income uncertainty revealed up to time t (Brownian motion part), and the interest rate uncertainty that has
been revealed up to time t (compensated compound Poisson part).
According to Proposition 1, when the borrower reports truthfully, his total expected utility under the
allocation  = ( ; I) conditional on the termination time  equals
V = V0 +
Z 
0
e ss

dYs   ds


+
Z 
0
e s sdMs:
As I and  depend exclusively on the borrowers report Y^ and the public interest rate process r, when the
borrower reports Y^ ; by (3) he gets the expected utility, a0(Y^ ), which equals
a0(Y^ ) = E
26664V0 +
Z 
0
e tt
 
dY^t   dt

!
+
Z 
0
e t tdMt +
Z 
0
e t(dYt   dY^t)| {z }
payo¤ from stealing
jF0
37775 =
E

V0 +
Z 
0
e tt

dYt   dt


+
Z 
0
e t

1  t


dYt   dY^t

+
Z 
0
e t tdMt jF0

: (4)
Note that because the process (;  ) = f(t;  t); 0  t  g is Ft predictable; as for any t  0, s  0;
E0 [Zt+s   Zt jF0 ] = E0 [Mt+s  Mt jF0 ] = 0; and given that E [V0 jF0 ] = V0; we have that
a0(Y^ ) = V0 + E
Z 
0
e t

1  t


dYt   dY^t

jF0

: (5)
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Representation (5) leads us to the following formulation of incentive compatibility.
Proposition 2 If the borrower cannot save, truth telling is incentive compatible if and only if t  
(m  a:s:) for all t   :
Proof Immediately follows from (5).
It is important to stress that in providing incentives for truth telling one can neglect an impact of
reporting strategies on the magnitude of the adjustments,  ; in the borrowers promised value that occurs
when the lenders interest rate changes. It follows from (4) that, though in principle the reporting strategy
of the borrower does a¤ect the magnitude of these adjustments, from the perspective of the borrower such
adjustments have zero e¤ect on the borrowers expected utility whatever is his reporting strategy. This
property considerably simplies the formulation of incentive compatibility.
To characterize the optimal allocation recursively, we dene the borrowers continuation value at time t
if he tells the truth as
at = E
Z 
t
e (s t) [dIs + ds] + e ( t)A jFt

:
Note that for t   we have that
Vt =
Z t
0
e s(dIs + dt) + e tat:
But this, together with (3), implies the following law of motion of the borrowers continuation value:
dat = atdt  dt  dIt + tdZt +  tdMt = (at       t(rt)) dt  dIt + tdZt +  tdNt: (6)
Here we discuss informally, using the dynamic programming approach, how to nd out the most e¢ cient
way to deliver a borrower any promised utility a  A. The proof of Proposition 3 formalizes our discussion
below. Let b(a; r) be the highest expected utility of the lender that can be obtained from an incentive
compatible allocation that provides the borrower with utility equal to a given that the current interest rate
is equal to r. To simplify our discussion we assume that the function b is concave and C2 in its rst argument.
Let b0 and b00 denote, respectively, the rst and the second derivative of b with respect to the borrowers
continuation utility a.
We start by observing that transferring lump-sum dI from the lender to the borrower with promised
utility a; moves an allocation to that of the borrowers promised utility of a  dI: The e¢ ciency implies that
b(a; r)  b(a  dI; r)  dI; (7)
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which shows that for all (a; r) 2 [A;1)frL; rHg the marginal cost of delivering the borrower his promised
utility can never exceed the cost of an immediate transfer in terms of the lenders utility, that is
b0(a; r)   1:
Dene a1(r); r 2 frL; rHg, as the lowest value of a such that b0(a; r) =  1: Then, it is optimal to pay the
borrower as follows
dI(a; r) = max(a  a1(r); 0):
These transfers, and the option to terminate, keep the borrowers promised value between A and a1(r): But
this implies that when a 2 [A; a1(r)]; and when the borrower is telling the truth, his promised value evolves
according to
dat(rt) = (atdt  dt  dIt) + tdZt +  t (dNt   (rt)dt) : (8)
We need to characterize the optimal choice of process (t;  t); where
t
 determines the sensitivity of the
borrowers promised value with respect to his report, and  t determines the adjustment of the borrowers
promised value due to a change in the interest rate. Using Itos lemma, we nd that
db(at; rt) = (at       t(rt))b0(at; rt)dt
+
1
2
2t b
00(at; rt)dt+ tb
0(at; rt)dZt + [b(at +  t; r
c
t )  b(at; rt)] dNt;
where rct = frL; rHg n frtg. Using the above equation, we nd that the lenders expected cash ows and the
change in the value he assigns to the allocation are given as follows:
E [dYt + db(at; rt) jFt ] =
+ (at       t(rt))b0(at; rt) +
1
2
2t b
00(at; rt) + (rt) (b(at +  t; r
c
t )  b(at; rt))

dt:
From Proposition 2, we know that if t   for all t   then the borrowers best response strategy is
to report the truth, that is, Y^ = Y: Because at the optimum, at any time t; the lender should earn an
instantaneous total return equal to the interest rate, rt, we have the following Bellman equation for the
value function
rtb(at; rt) = max
t,  tA at
24 + (at       t(rt))b0(at; rt)+
1
2
2
t b
00(at; rt) + (rt) (b(at +  t; r
c
t )  b(at; rt))
35 : (9)
Given the concavity of the function b(; rt), b00(at; rt) = d
2b(at;rt)
da2t
 0, setting
t = 
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for all t   is optimal. The concavity of the objective function in  t in the RHS of the Bellman equation
(9) also implies that the optimal choice of  t is given as a solution to
b0(at; rt) = b0(at +  t; r
c
t ); (10)
provided that  t > A  at; and otherwise  t = A  at. Note that this implies that  t =  (at; rt):
The lenders value function therefore satises the following di¤erential equation
rtb(at; rt) = + (at       (at; rt)(rt))b0(at; rt)
+
1
2
2b00(at; rt) + (rt) (b(at +  (at; rt); rct )  b(at; rt)) (11)
with b(at; rt) = b(a1(rt); rt)  (a  a1(rt)) for at > a1(rt) and the function  specied above.
We need some boundary conditions to pin down a solution to this equation and the boundaries a1(r);
r 2 frL; rHg. The rst boundary condition arises because the relationship must be terminated to hold the
borrowers value to A, so b(A; rt) = L. The second boundary condition comes from the fact that the rst
derivatives must agree at the boundary, so b0(a1(rt); rt) =  1: The nal boundary condition is the condition
for the optimality of a1(rt), which requires that the second derivatives match at the boundary. This condition
implies that b00(a1(rt); rt) = 0, or equivalently, using equation (11), that
rtb(a
1(rt); rt) = +    a1(rt)
+(rt)

 (a1(rt); rt) + b(a
1(rt) +  (a
1(rt); rt); r
c
t )  b(a1(rt); rt)

: (12)
By denition, a1(r) is the lowest value of a such that b0(a; r) =  1; thus
 (a1(rL); rL) =   (a1(rH); rH) = a1(rH)  a1(rL):
This, combined with (12) implies that
+  = rLb(a
1(rL); rL) + a
1(rL)  (rL)

b(a1(rH); rH)  b(a1(rL); rL) + a1(rH)  a1(rL)

;
+  = rHb(a
1(rH); rH) + a
1(rH)  (rH)

b(a1(rL); rL)  b(a1(rH); rH) + a1(rL)  a1(rH)

:
The proposition below formalizes our ndings.
Proposition 3 An optimal allocation that delivers to the borrower the value a0 takes the following form.
There exists boundaries: a1(r), r 2 frL; rHg ; such that
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(i) If a0 2 [A; a1(r0)]; r0 2 frL; rHg ; at evolves as
dat(rt) = (atdt  dt  dIt) + (dY^t   dt) +  (at; rt)(dNt   (rt)dt); (13)
and
when at 2 [A; a1(rt)), dIt = 0;
when at = a1(rt) the transfers dIt cause at to reect at a1(rt):
(ii) If a0 > a1(r0) an immediate transfer a0   a1(r0) is made.
The relationship is terminated at time  when at hits A. The lenders expected utility (expected prot) at
any point is given by a concave function b(at; rt), which satises:
rtb(at; rt) =
+ (at       (at; rt)(rt))b0(at; rt) + 1
2
2b00(at; rt) + (rt) (b(at +  (at; rt); rct )  b(at; rt)) (14)
when at is in the interval [A; a1(rt)] and b0(at; rt) =  1, when at > a1(rt), with boundary conditions
b(A; rt) = L and
+  = rLb(a
1(rL); rL) + a
1(rL)  (rt)

b(a1(rH); rH)  b(a1(rL); rL) + a1(rH)  a1(rL)

;
+  = rHb(a
1(rH); rH) + a
1(rH)  (rt)

b(a1(rL); rL)  b(a1(rH); rH) + a1(rL)  a1(rH)

:
The function  is dened as follows
 (at; rt) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
is a solution to b0(at; rt) = b0(at +  t; r
c
t ) for all (at; rt)
for which the solution is such that  (at; rt) > A  at;
otherwise it is equal to A  at
; (15)
where rct = frL; rHg n frtg :
Proof In the Appendix.
The evolution of the promised value (13) implied by the optimal allocation serves three objectives -
promise keeping, incentives, and e¢ ciency. The rst component of (13) accounts for promise keeping. In
order for at to correctly describe the lenders promise to the borrower, it should grow at the borrowers
discount rate, ; less the payment, dt, he receives from owning the home, and less the ow of payments,
dIt; from the lender.
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The second term of (13) provides the borrower with incentives to report truthfully his income to the
lender. Because of ine¢ ciencies resulting from liquidation, reducing the risk in the borrowers payo¤ lowers
the probability that the borrowers payo¤ reaches A, and thus lowers the probability of costly liquidation.
Therefore, it is optimal to make the sensitivity of the borrowers payo¤ with respect to its report as small
as possible provided that it does not erode his incentives to tell the truth. The minimum volatility of
the borrowers promised value with respect to his report of income required for truth-telling equals 1. To
understand this, note that, under this choice of volatility, underreporting income by one unit would provide
the borrower with one additional unit of current utility through increased consumption, but would also
reduce the borrowers promised utility by one unit, so that this volatility provides the borrower with just
enough incentives to report a true realization of income. Note that when the borrower reports truthfully,
the term

dY^t   dt

is driftless and equals to dZt.
The last term of (13) captures the e¤ects of changes in the lenders interest rate process on the borrowers
promised utility. The optimal adjustments,  , in the borrowers promised utility, which are applicable when
there is a change in the lenders interest rate, are such that the sensitivity of the lenders expected utility, b,
with respect to the borrowers promised utility, a, is equalized just before and after an adjustment is made.9
This sensitivity represents an instantaneous marginal cost of delivering the borrower his promised payo¤ in
terms of the lenders utility, and so the e¢ ciency calls for equalizing this cost across the states. We note
that these adjustments imply the compensating trend in the borrowers promised payo¤,  (rt) (at; rt)dt,
which exactly o¤sets the expected e¤ect these adjustments have on the borrowers expected utility.
Below we prove a useful lemma that characterizes the behavior of the optimal allocation when the
borrowers promised payo¤ is close to liquidation and there is an interest rate change.
Lemma 3 At the optimal allocation, there exists a 2 (A; a1(rL)] such that
-  (A; rH) = a A;
-  (a; rL) = A  a for a 2 [A; a]:
Proof From the denition of function b and the fact that rL < rH it follows that, for any a > A,
b(a; rL) > b(a; rH): This, together with b(A; rL) = b(A; rH) = L, implies that b0(A+; rL) > b0(A+; rH). Let
a be the smallest a > A such that b0(a; rL) = b0(A+; rH). The existence of such a follows from the fact that,
for any a 2 [A; a1(rt)]; b0(a; rt)   1 and b0(a1(rt); rt) =  1: This combined with (15) yields us the alleged
properties of function  .
Corollary 1 Lemma 3 implies that under the optimal allocation, whenever at 2 (A; a], an instantaneous
increase of the interest rate, rt; triggers the termination of the relationship.
9Provided that the solution to (10) is interior.
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4.2 The Optimal Allocation with Hidden Savings
So far we have characterized the optimal allocation under the assumption that the borrower cannot save.
Now we show that, given the optimal allocation of the problem with no hidden savings, the borrower has no
incentive to save at the solution, and thus the allocation of Proposition 3 is also optimal in the environment
where the borrower can privately save.
Proposition 4 Suppose that the process at is bounded above and solves
dat = atdt  dt  dIt + (dY^t   dt) +  tdMt (16)
until stopping time  = min ft jat = Ag ; where  t is an Ft predictable process. Then the borrowers expected
utility from any feasible strategy in response to an allocation ( ; I) is at most a0: Moreover, payo¤ a0 is
attained if the borrower reports truthfully and maintains zero savings.
Proof In the Appendix.
The above proposition shows that allocations from a broad class, including the optimal allocation of
Proposition 3, remain incentive-compatible even if the borrower is allowed to privately save.
4.3 An Example
In this section we illustrate the features of the optimal allocation in a parametrized example. Table 1 shows
the parameters of the model.
Table 1. Parameters of the model
Interest rate process
Borrowers
discount rate
Income
process
Utility ow
from home
Liquidation
values
rL rH (rL) (rH)     A L
1.5% 6.5% 0.2 0.2 8% 1 1 1 12.5 12
The left hand-side of Figure 1 shows the lenders value function at both interest rates as a function of
the borrowers continuation value. For a given promise to the borrower, the value function of the lender at
the low interest rate is always above the one at the high interest rate, except at termination when they are
equal, as the lender attaches more value to the proceeds from the continuation of the relationship when his
discount rate is lower. As we observe, it is optimal to allow the borrower to consume his disposable income
earlier when the interest rate is low, that is a1(rL) < a1(rH). Intuitively, when the lenders interest rate is
low, it is more costly to postpone borrowers consumption, as tension between the borrowers valuation of
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Figure 1: The lenders value function and the optimal adjustments in the borrowers continuation utility.
future payo¤s and that of the lender is larger. To reduce this cost, it is optimal to allow the borrower to
consume his excess disposable income earlier.
The right hand-side of Figure 1 shows the optimal adjustments in the borrowers promised utility,  ,
applicable when there is a change in the market interest rate. The borrowers promised utility increases with
a decrease in the interest rate and decreases with an interest rate increase, except in the area close to the
reection barriers when this relationship is reversed. The size of these adjustments is proportional to the
distance of the borrowers promise from the termination cuto¤ of A.
The optimal adjustment of the borrowers continuation utility,  , is shaped by two competing forces
stemming from, respectively, the costly termination of the relationship and the di¤erence in the discount
rates. The closer the borrowers continuation utility is to the termination boundary A; the bigger is the
role played by the costly termination in shaping the optimal adjustment function. It is e¢ cient to reduce
the chances of costly termination when the interest rate falls, as the stream of transfers from the borrower
is more valuable for the lender when the interest rate is low. A reduction in the likelihood of termination
is engineered by inuencing the borrowers promise in two ways. First, it is optimal to instantaneously
increase the borrowers promise if the market interest rate falls, and this is even more so the more likely the
relationship is to be terminated. Second, it is optimal to introduce a positive trend in the law of motion of
the borrowers continuation utility, which reinforces the rst adjustment over time to the extent the interest
rate stays low. As a result of these adjustments, the chances of costly home repossession are reduced by
moving the borrowers continuation payo¤ further away from the termination boundary A. However, the
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threat of repossession must be real enough in order for the borrower to share his income with the lender. As
a result, the optimal allocation increases the chances of repossession when the interest rate is high in order
to compensate for the weakened threat of repossession in the low-interest state, both by instantaneously
decreasing the borrowers continuation utility and by introducing a negative trend in its law of motion.
If the borrowers continuation utility is distant from the termination boundary A; then, intuitively,
the discrepancy in the discount rates begins to play the dominant role in shaping the optimal adjustment
function, as the likelihood of termination is small. When the lenders interest rate switches to low, there is
more tension between the borrowers valuation of future payo¤s and that of the lender, and thus it is more
costly to postpone the borrowers consumption, the more so the bigger is his promise. To reduce this cost, it is
optimal to decrease the borrowers promise when the interest rate falls, by both an instantaneous adjustment
and a negative time trend, provided that his prior promise was su¢ ciently large. In order to compensate for
this reduction in the borrowers promise when the interest rate switches to low, his continuation utility is
increased to a range of high values of the borrowers promise when the interest rate increases. It is important
to observe that the adjustment of the borrowers promise in this region has second order welfare e¤ects. This
is because there is less di¤erence between the slopes of the lenders value function at the low and at the high
interest rate state, the further away the borrowers promise is from the termination boundary A:We will use
this fact in Section 6, where we simply ignore the adjustments of the borrowers promise in a region close to
the reection barriers.
5 Implementations of the Optimal Allocation
So far, we have characterized the optimal allocation in terms of the transfers between the borrower and the
lender and the liquidation time of their relationship. In this section, we show that the optimal allocation
can be implemented using nancial arrangements that resemble the ones used in the residential mortgage
market. We start with the following denition.
Denition 6 The mortgage contract is optimal if it implements the optimal allocation of Proposition 3.
5.1 Interest Only Mortgage with Home Equity Line of Credit (HELOC) and
Two Way Balance Adjustment
In this section we consider a loan contract, which is a combination of two forms of debt - an interest only
mortgage and a second "piggyback"10 mortgage that closes simultaneously with the rst. Recently, there
has been a noticeable increase in the use of "piggyback" mortgages, and many lenders structure a second
"piggyback" loan as a home equity line of credit. These lines are revolving lines of credit like credit cards, yet
10Named as such in the housing nance industry because a second mortgage is "piggybacked" onto the original mortgage
loan.
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they are secured by the borrowers home collateral. Homeowners who pay o¤ the line of credit can continue
to draw upon it and use the funds for other purposes. A denition below formally describes a contract that
consists of an interest only mortgage with a home equity line of credit.
Denition 7 Interest only mortgage with home equity line of credit and two way balance adjustment consists
of:
- Home equity line of credit with a time-t limit equal to CLt : The initial balance equals B0: At any time
t, an instantaneous interest rate on the time-t balance, Bt; is equal to rt. If the balance on the credit
line exceeds its limit, default occurs.
- Balance adjustment, that is, an adjustment of the borrowers balance on the home equity line of credit
by BAt, applicable when there is an interest rate change.
- Interest only mortgage with a required coupon (interest payment) equal to xt: If the coupon is not paid
default occurs.
- When default happens, the lender receives the liquidation value of the home equal to L, and the borrower
obtains the value of his outside option equal to A.
The proposition below shows that the optimal allocation can be implemented with a mortgage contract
belonging to the class of contracts dened above.
Proposition 5 There exists an optimal interest only mortgage with HELOC and two way balance adjustment
that has the following features:
rt(Bt; rt) =  + (rt)

 (a1(rt) Bt; rt)   (a1(rt); rt)

Bt
; (17)
CLt (rt) = a
1(rt) A; (18)
xt(rt) =  +   a1(rt) + (rt) (a1(rt); rt); (19)
BA(Bt; rt) =   (a1(rt) Bt; rt) + (a1(rct )  a1(rt)): (20)
Under this mortgage contract, it is incentive compatible for the borrower to refrain from stealing. Once the
borrower balance reaches zero, all excess disposable income is consumed by the borrower. With this mortgage
contract, the borrowers expected payo¤, at, is determined by the current HELOC balance, Bt; as follows:
at = A+

CLt (rt) Bt

= a1(rt) Bt: (21)
Proof In the Appendix.
How does the above implementation insure that the borrower refrains from stealing and consumes all
excess disposable income only when his HELOC balance reaches zero? Given a time-t balance Bt on the
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HELOC, the borrower can immediately consume all his available credit in the amount of CLt (rt)   Bt and
default, which allows him to receive his outside option of A. But (21) implies that the payo¤ from this
strategy is equal to at, which is the expected utility he would obtain by postponing consumption until his
HELOC balance is zero.
In the implementation of Proposition 5, the balance on the home equity line of credit can be considered
as a memory device that summarizes all the relevant information regarding the past cash ow realizations
revealed by the borrower through repayments. The interest rate along with the required mortgage coupon
payment, balance adjustment, and the credit line limit, determine the dynamics of the balance on the HELOC
and the timing of default.
The adjustable features of the above mortgage contract are needed to implement the e¤ects of the changes
in the interest rate on the borrowers continuation utility. We remember that these adjustments take two
forms - the instantaneous adjustment when the interest rate changes, and the compensating trend in the law
of motion of the borrowers utility. In the above implementation, the balance adjustment (20) implements
the instantaneous adjustments in the borrowers promised utility that are applicable when there is a change
in the interest rate. The variable part of the interest rate (17) guarantees that a change in the borrowers
promised utility implied by the mortgage contract includes the trend that compensates the borrower, in
expectation, for the instantaneous adjustments in his promise utility that happen when the interest rate
changes.
The xed component of the variable interest rate (17) on the HELOC insures that under the optimal
strategy of the borrower, given the above mortgage contract, his promised utility increases at the rate of
, as in the optimal allocation of Proposition 3. The mortgage coupon (19) guarantees that the change in
the borrowers promised utility implied by the mortgage contract reects the reduction by the payments
the borrower receives from owning the home. It also insures that an above-average income realization,
and so an above-average repayment, increases the borrowers promised utility, which corresponds here to a
decrease in his HELOC balance, and vice versa. Finally, the dependence of the credit line limit (18) on the
current interest rate mirrors the dependence of the reection barriers, a1, on the interest rate in the optimal
allocation.
To further characterize the above mortgage contract we, will restrict our attention to the environment in
which the optimal contract satises the following condition.11
Condition 1 The function  implied by the optimal allocation is such that  (a; rL) is strictly increasing in
a for a 2 [a; a1(aL)]; and so  (a; rH) is strictly decreasing in a for a 2 [A; a1(aH)], where a is dened as in
Lemma 3.
Proposition 5, together with Lemma 3, implies the following properties of the above mortgage contract.
11This condition holds in all parametrized examples we considered.
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Figure 2: Optimal balance adjustment and the variable interest rate on the HELOC debt.
Corollary 2 The optimal interest only mortgage with HELOC and two way balance adjustment has the
following features:
i) Let B = a1(rL) a where a is dened in Lemma 3. Then, whenever Bt 2 [ B;CLt (rL)); an instantaneous
change of the interest rate from rL to rH triggers the default of the mortgage;
ii) BA(B; rt) = 0 for B = 0. Suppose further that the optimal function  satises the properties of
Condition 1. Then,
BA(B; rL) is positive and strictly increasing in B for B 2 (0; B];
BA(B; rH) is negative and strictly decreasing in B for B 2 (0; CLt (rH)];
 rt(B0; rL) <  < rt(B00; rH); for any B0 2 [0; CLt (rL)]; B00 2 [0; CLt (rH)]:
As the above corollary shows, under the optimal interest only mortgage with HELOC and two way
balance adjustment, whenever the HELOC balance is close to the credit limit, an increase in the interest
rate would cause the liquidation of the mortgage. Provided that the optimal adjustment function,  , satises
the properties of Condition 1, a decrease in the interest rate causes a decrease in the borrowers HELOC
balance and vice versa. The magnitude of these adjustments is proportional to the HELOC balance. The
variable interest rate on the HELOC balance positively correlates with the lenders interest rate. It is
optimal to reduce mortgage payments, and as a result default rates, when the market interest rate is low
because, in this case, the stream of borrowers payments is more valuable for the lender. However, the threat
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of repossession must be real enough in order for the borrower to share his income with the lender. As a
result the optimal mortgage increases the chances of repossession when the interest rate is high in order to
compensate for the weakened threat of repossession in the low state by requiring higher mortgage payments
and default rates. Figure 2 presents the optimal balance adjustment and the variable interest rate on the
HELOC debt in the parametrized environment of Section 4.3.
Although mortgages with HELOC and two way balance adjustment are interesting from the theoretical
point of view, we do not yet observe anything like that in practice. While we actually observe reductions
of mortgage debt balance in the form of "cramdown" provisions, the unusual feature of these mortgages is
the automatic increase in debt balance in response to a market interest rate increase. Below we discuss an
implementation using the interest only mortgage with HELOC with a preferential rate and one way balance
adjustment that addresses this issue.
5.2 Interest Only Mortgage with HELOC with Preferential Rate and One Way
Balance Adjustment
In this section we consider a combination of an interest only mortgage with HELOC, where a part of the
HELOC balance is subject to a preferential interest rate. The adjustment of the HELOC debt is only allowed
when the lenders interest rate declines. The denition below provides a formal description of this class of
mortgage contracts.
Denition 8 The interest only mortgage with HELOC with preferential rate and one way balance adjustment
consists of:
- HELOC with a time-t limit equal to CLt (rt): The initial balance equals B0: At any time t, an instan-
taneous interest rate on a time-t balance, Bt; is equal to r
p
t on the portion of the balance below a
preferential range, pt  0, and rt on the portion of the balance above pt. If the amount of debt subject
to the preferential rate falls to zero, the mortgage is reset to other contract;
- Negative balance adjustment, that is the adjustment of the HELOC debt by BA t when the lenders
interest rate decreases;
- Interest only mortgage with a required coupon payment equal to xt: If the coupon is not paid, default
occurs;
- When default happens, the lender receives the liquidation value of the home equal to L, and the borrower
obtains the value of his outside option, equal to A.
The proposition below shows that the optimal allocation can be implemented with a mortgage contract
belonging to the class of contracts dened above.
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Proposition 6 There exists an optimal interest only mortgage with HELOC with preferential rate and one
way balance adjustment that has the following features:
rpt = 0; (22)
rt(Bt   pt; rt) =  + (rt)

 (a1(rt)  (Bt   pt); rt)   (a1(rt); rt)

Bt   pt ; (23)
dpt =
8<:

 (a1(rL)  (Bt   pt); rL) 
 
a1(rH)  a1(rL)

I(rt =rL) if Bt  pt
0; if Bt < pt
; (24)
BA (Bt   pt) =   (a1(rH)  (Bt   pt); rH) +

a1(rL)  a1(rH)

; (25)
xt(rt) =  +   a1(rt) + (rt) (a1(rt); rt); (26)
CLt (pt; rt) = pt + a
1(rt) A: (27)
Under this mortgage contract, it is incentive compatible for the borrower to refrain from stealing. Once the
borrowers balance falls to the preferential debt limit, p, all excess disposable income is consumed by the
borrower. For the debt balance Bt  pt, the borrowers expected payo¤, at, is determined by the current
HELOC balance above the preferential debt limit, as follows:
at = A+

CLt (pt; rt) Bt

= a1(rt)  (Bt   pt): (28)
If the amount of debt subject to the preferential rate falls to zero, the mortgage is reset to a contract that
implements the continuation of the optimal allocation.
Proof In the Appendix.
The above implementation insures that the borrower refrains from stealing and consumes all excess
disposable income only when his time-t HELOC balance, Bt, falls to the debt limit, pt, which is subject
to the preferential interest rate. Intuitively, given a time-t balance Bt on the HELOC, the borrower can
immediately consume all his available credit in the amount of CLt (pt; rt) Bt and default, which allows him
to receive his outside option of A. But (28) implies that the payo¤ from this strategy is equal to at, which is
the expected utility the borrower would obtain by postponing consumption until his HELOC balance falls
to the preferential debt limit.
In the implementation of Proposition 6, the balance on the HELOC above the debt limit subject to the
preferential interest rate can be considered as a memory device that summarizes all the relevant information
regarding past cash ow realizations revealed by the borrower through repayments. The interest rates, along
with the required mortgage coupon payment, the negative balance adjustment, the preferential debt limit,
and the credit line limit determine the dynamics of the balance on the HELOC and the timing of default.
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As in the previous implementation, the adjustable features of the above mortgage contract are needed to
implement the e¤ects of the changes in the interest rate on the borrowers continuation utility. In the above
implementation, the balance adjustment (25) implements the instantaneous adjustments in the borrowers
promised utility that are applicable when the lenders interest rate decreases. The adjustments of the
preferential debt limit (24) implement the instantaneous adjustments in the borrowers promised utility that
are applicable when the lenders interest rate increases. The variable component of the interest rate (23)
guarantees that a change in the borrowers promised utility implied by the mortgage contract includes the
trend that compensates the borrower, in expectation, for the instantaneous adjustments in his promise utility
that happen when the interest rate changes.
The xed component of the interest rate (23) on the HELOC balance above the preferential debt limit
insures that, under the optimal strategy of the borrower, given the above mortgage contract, his promised
utility would be increased at the rate of , as in the optimal allocation. The mortgage coupon (26) guarantees
that a change in the borrowers promised utility implied by the mortgage contract reects the reduction by
the payments the borrower receives from owning the home. The coupon also insures that an above average
income realization, and so an above average repayment, increases the borrowers promised utility, which
corresponds here to a decrease in his HELOC balance, and vice versa. Finally, the dependence of the credit
line limit (27) on the current interest rate mirrors the dependence of the reection barriers, a1, on the current
interest rate in the optimal allocation.
In the proposed implementation, parameter p0  0 at time zero can be chosen arbitrary. One way to
initialize the mortgage is to set the market value of the mortgage equal to the book value:
B0 = b
 
r0; p0 + a
1(r0) B0

:
Proposition 6, together with Lemma 3, imply the following properties of the above mortgage contract.
Corollary 3 The optimal interest only mortgage with HELOC with preferential rate and one way balance
adjustment has the following features:
i) Let Bt = pt + a1(rL)  a where a is dened as in Lemma 3. Then, whenever Bt 2 [ Bt; CLt (pt; rL)); an
instantaneous increase in the lenders interest rate triggers the default of the mortgage;
ii) BA (Bt   pt) = 0 for Bt = pt. Suppose further that the optimal function  optimal contract satises
the properties of Condition 1. Then,
BA (Bt   pt) is negative and strictly decreasing in (Bt   pt) for Bt 2 (pt; CLt (rH)];
 dpt  0 for any Bt  pt; with strict inequality whenever the interest rate, rt, increases and
Bt > pt;
 rt(B0   p0t; rL) <  < rt(B00   p00t ; rH); for any B0 2 [p0t; CLt (rL)]; B00 2 [p00t ; CLt (rH)]:
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Figure 3: A simulated path of the optimal interest only mortgage with HELOC.
As the above corollary shows, under the optimal interest only mortgage with HELOC with preferential
rate and one way balance adjustment, whenever the HELOC balance is close to the credit limit, an increase in
the interest rate would cause the liquidation of the mortgage. If the optimal adjustment function,  ; satises
the properties of Condition 1, a decrease in the interest rate causes a decrease in the borrowers HELOC
balance. The magnitude of this adjustment is proportional to the HELOC balance. This adjustment can be
interpreted as o¤ering the borrower an automatic "cramdown" provision, whenever the interest rate switches
to low. An increase in the interest rate causes a drop in the amount of debt subject to the preferential interest
rate. Consequently, under this contract, it is optimal to reduce the preferential treatment of the HELOC
debt over time. We note that a declining preferential treatment of debt over time is a typical feature of
many mortgage contracts currently o¤ered in the housing nance market. As in the mortgage contract with
variable interest rate and two way balance adjustment, the variable interest rate on the HELOC balance
(23) positively correlates with the lenders interest rate.
27
Figure 4: The optimal negative balance adjustment and the variable interest rate on the HELOC debt.
The top part of Figure 3 presents a simulated path of the market interest rate, the middle one presents
a simulated path of the borrowers continuation value under the optimal allocation, and the bottom one
presents the behavior of credit line, the preferential debt range, and the HELOC balance implied by the
optimal mortgage contract of Proposition 6, where the parameters of the model are set as in Section 4.3.
Figure 4 presents the optimal negative balance adjustment and the variable interest rate on the HELOC
debt in this parametrized example.
The implementation with an interest only mortgage and HELOC with one way balance adjustment avoids
increasing the borrowers debt when the interest rate changes from low to high by decreasing instead the
amount of balance subject to the preferential rate. Similarly, one could avoid the reduction of the borrowers
debt (negative balance adjustment) when the interest rate decreases, by considering an implementation
where the total amount of debt is left unchanged and instead, the balance subject to the preferential rate is
increased. Below we discuss an implementation using the option ARM that exploits this idea.
5.3 Option Adjustable Rate Mortgage
In this section we consider an option ARM. This is an adjustable rate mortgage on which the borrower is
o¤ered an option on how large a payment to make. A part of the mortgage debt is subject to the preferential
interest rate. The denition below provides a formal description of this class of mortgage contracts.
Denition 9 An option adjustable rate mortgage with preferential interest rate consists of:
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- Mortgage debt with a time-t negative amortization limit equal to CLt : If the debt exceeds the negative
amortization limit, default occurs. The initial balance is equal to B0  p0;
- At any time t, an instantaneous interest rate on a time-t debt balance, Bt; is equal to a preferential rate
rpt   on a part of the balance below pt, and rt on a part of debt balance above pt. If the preferential
rate reaches its upper boundary , the mortgage is reset to other contract;
- When default happens, the lender receives the liquidation value of the home equal to L, and the borrower
obtains the value of his outside option equal to A.
The proposition below shows that the optimal allocation can be implemented with a mortgage contract
belonging to the class of contracts dened above.
Proposition 7 There exists an optimal option adjustable rate mortgage with preferential interest rate that
has the following features
rt(Bt   pt; rt) =  + (rt)

 (a1(rt)  (Bt   pt); rt)   (a1(rt); rt)

Bt   pt ; if Bt  pt (29)
rpt (pt; rt) =
 +   a1(rt) + (rt) (a1(rt); rt)
pt
(30)
CLt (pt; rt) = pt + a
1(rt) A (31)
dpt =
8<:

 (a1(rt)  (Bt   pt); rt) 
 
a1(rct )  a1(rt)

dNt; if Bt  pt
0; if Bt < pt
: (32)
Under the terms of this mortgage, it is incentive compatible for the borrower to refrain from stealing and
maintain balance Bt above pt. The borrower uses all available cash ows to pay the balance when Bt > pt,
and consumes all excess cash ows once the balance drops to pt. For the debt balance Bt  pt, the borrowers
expected payo¤, at, is determined by the current balance above the preferential debt limit as follows:
at = A+

CLt (pt; rt) Bt

= a1(rt)  (Bt   pt) (33)
If the preferential rate reaches its upper boundary , the mortgage is reset to a contract that implements the
continuation of the optimal allocation.
Proof In the Appendix.
How does the above implementation insure that the borrower refrains from stealing and consumes all
excess disposable income only when his time-t debt balance, Bt, falls to the debt limit, pt, subject to the
preferential interest rate given by (30)? Given a time-t balance Bt, the borrower can immediately consume
all his available credit in the amount of CLt (pt; rt) Bt and default, which allows him to receive his outside
option of A. But (33) implies that the payo¤ from this strategy is equal to at, that is the expected utility
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the borrower would obtain by postponing consumption until his debt balance falls to the preferential debt
limit.
As in the implementation with interest only mortgage and HELOC with preferential interest rate, the
debt balance above the debt limit subject to the preferential interest rate can be considered as a memory
device that summarizes all the relevant information regarding the past cash ow realizations revealed by the
borrower through repayments. The interest rates, along with the preferential debt limit, and the credit line
limit, determine the dynamics of the debt balance and the timing of default.
As in the previous implementations, the adjustable features of the above mortgage contract are needed to
implement the e¤ects of the changes in the interest rate on the borrowers continuation utility. In the optimal
option ARM, the adjustments of the debt subject to the preferential rate (32) implement all instantaneous
adjustments in the borrowers promised utility that are applicable when the lenders interest rate changes.
The variable component of the interest rate (23) guarantees that a change in the borrowers promised utility
implied by the mortgage contract includes the trend that compensates the borrower, in expectation, for the
instantaneous adjustments in his promise utility that happen when the interest rate changes.
The xed component of the interest rate (29) on the debt above the preferential debt limit insures that
under the optimal strategy of the borrower, given the above mortgage contract, the borrowers promised
utility would be increased at the rate of  as in the optimal allocation. The preferential interest rate
insures that an above-average income realization and so an above-average repayment increases the borrowers
promised utility, which corresponds here to a decrease in his debt balance, and vice versa. Finally, the
dependence of the credit line limit (31) on the current interest rate mirrors the dependence of the reection
barriers, a1, on the current interest rate in the optimal allocation.
In the proposed implementation, parameter p0 at time zero can be chosen arbitrarily, provided interest
rate rp0 given by (30) is no greater than . One way to initiate the mortgage is to have the market value of
the mortgage be equal to the book value:
B0 = b
 
r0; p0 + a
1(r0) B0

:
Proposition 7, together with Lemma 3, implies the following properties of the above mortgage contract.
Corollary 4 The optimal option ARM with preferential interest rate has the following features:
i) Let Bt = pt + a1(rL)  a where a is dened as in Lemma 3. Then, whenever Bt 2 [ Bt; CLt (pt; rL)); an
instantaneous increase in the lenders interest rate triggers the default of the mortgage;
ii) Suppose further that the optimal function  optimal contract satises the properties of Condition 1,
then,
 dpt < 0; whenever interest rate, rt; increases and Bt > pt;
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 dpt > 0; whenever interest rate, rt; decreases and Bt > pt;
 rt(B0   p0t; rL) <  < rt(B00   p00t ; rH); for any B0 2 [p0t; CLt (rL)]; B00 2 [p00t ; CLt (rH)]:
As the above corollary shows, under the optimal option ARM with preferential interest rate, whenever
the debt balance is close to the negative amortization limit, an increase in the interest rate would cause the
liquidation of the mortgage. If the optimal adjustment function,  , satises the properties of Condition 1,
a decrease in the lenders interest rate causes an increase in the amount of debt subject to the preferential
rate and vice versa. As in the previous mortgage contracts with variable interest rate, the interest rate on
the debt balance, (29), positively correlates with the lenders interest rate.
Figure 5: A simulated path of the optimal option ARM.
The top part of Figure 5 presents a simulated path of the market interest rate, the middle one presenting
a simulated path of the borrowers continuation value under the optimal allocation, while the bottom one
presenting the behavior of credit line, the preferential debt limit, and the debt balance implied by the optimal
option ARM, where the parameters of the model are set as in Section 4.3. The variable interest rate on the
debt above the preferential debt limit is the same as shown in the right hand side of Figure 4.
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6 Approximate Implementations
In this section we consider simpler mortgage contracts that implement the optimal allocation approximately.
In order to dene an approximate implementation, we consider the following change in the optimal allocation
of Proposition 3. Replace the optimal function  in Proposition 3 by any function  ^ : [A;1) frL; rHg !
R, such that,  ^(a; r) + a  A for any a  A; and replace the reection barriers a1(r); r 2 frL; rHg, by any
nite a^1(r)  A, r 2 frL; rHg. Under this allocation, the borrowers continuation utility process, a^t; solves:
da^t = a^tdt  dt  dI^t + (dY^t   dt) +  ^(a^t; rt)dMt; (34)
given initial a^0 = a0, where I^t = max(0; a^t   a^1(rt)), for any 0  t  ^ = infft : a^t = Ag: Proposition 4
implies that the borrowers expected utility from any feasible strategy in response to the above allocation
is, at most, a0; and is attained if the borrower reports truthfully and maintains zero savings. The lenders
expected value under this allocation and the borrowers optimal strategy is equal to
E
24 ^Z
0
e Rt(dYt   dI^t) + e R^ ^L jF0
35 ; (35)
which is by denition less than or equal to the lenders value under the optimal allocation, given a0.
In what follows, we will focus on the following approximation to the optimal functions  and a1:
Denition 10 The approximately optimal function  ^ and a^1 satisfy
- a^1 = a^1(rL) = a^1(rH) and  ^(a^1; rL) =  ^(a^1; rH) = 0.
Whenever a1(rL)  a1(rH), a^1 = inf fa  A :  (a; rL) =  (a; rH) = 0g,
-  ^(a; rL) =
8<: A  a for a 2 [A; a];where a¯ is dened in Lemma 3,  a Aa^1 a  a^1   a for a 2 [a; a^1];
-  ^(a; rH) =

a A
a^1 A

(a^1   a) for a 2 [A; a^1] ;
where  and a1 are the functions from the optimal contract of Proposition 3.
Figure 6 presents the approximately optimal function  ^ and a^1, together with their optimal counterparts
in the parametrized environment of Section 4.3.
Consequently, we have the following denitions of, respectively, the approximately optimal allocation and
the approximately optimal mortgage contract.
Denition 11 Given an initial promise to the borrower, a^0 = a0, the approximately optimal allocation is
an allocation where the borrowers continuation utility process solves (34) and the lenders value is given by
(35), where  ^ and a^ are approximately optimal functions in the sense of Denition 10.
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Figure 6: The approximately optimal function  ^ and a^1:
Denition 12 The approximately optimal mortgage contract is a contract that implements the approximately
optimal allocation of Denition 11.
We note that none of Propositions 5 - 7 concerning the implementation of the optimal allocation rely on
any particular properties of functions  and a1 in establishing the incentive compatibility of the postulated
response of the borrower to these contracts. This implies that the mortgage contracts of Propositions 5 - 7,
where the function  is replaced by  ^ and the reation barriers a1(r) are replaced by a^1(r), r 2 frL; rHg,
implements an allocation where the borrowers continuation utility process solves (34) and the lenders value
is given by (35).
6.1 E¢ ciency Gains Due to Optimal and Approximately Optimal Contracts
How close is the expected lenders value function under the approximately optimal mortgage contract to the
value he would obtain under the optimal contract? What are the gains in terms of the lenders value from
using the contracts that adjust the borrowers promise when the lenders interest rate changes? To shed
some light on these questions, we compare the lenders value under, respectively, the approximately optimal
contract and the optimal contract, with a best value achievable, for a given borrowers promise, under a
simple contract, where no adjustments in the borrowers continuation value are allowed due to changes in
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Figure 7: Gains in basis points of the lenders value under the optimal and the approximately optimal
contract.
the lenders interest rate.12
Figure 7 presents the percentage improvement (in basis points) in the lenders value across the borrowers
promise, which comes from switching from the best contract, where no adjustments in the borrowers continu-
ation value are allowed due to changes in the lenders interest rate to, respectively, the approximately optimal
contract, and the optimal contract. The computations are performed in the parametrized environment of
Section 4.3.
As we observe from Figure 7, the value of the lender under the approximately optimal contract is close
to that under the optimal contract with loss ranging from zero to just above 10 basis points of the value to
the lender. Both contracts yield much better performance compared to the contract that sets  = 0. The
gain can be as high as 70 basis points and, in the renegotiation proof region, the gain can be well above 40
basis points for the optimal contract and well above 30 basis points for the approximately optimal contract.
Many reasonable models of determination of initial starting point in terms of the borrowers promised
utility will have a property that the borrowers promise increases with the amount of downpayment (Y0).
Figure 7 indicates that, if this is the case, the largest e¢ ciency gains in the renegotiation proof region are
12This contract is found by solving, for a given promise to the borrower, the problem of maximizing the lenders expected
utility subject to incentive compatibility and promise keeping constraints, and subject to an additional constraint that forbids
any adjustments in the borrowers continuation value due to changes in the lenders interest rate.
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to be realized on the optimal mortgages given to households that make little or no downpayment.
This comparison suggests that there are substantial e¢ ciency gains from using mortgage contracts that
are contingent on the realization of the lenders interest rate, such as the optimal option ARM or the interest
only mortgage with HELOC described in Section 5, compared to the contracts that do not depend on the
lenders interest rate. At the same time, the implementation of the optimal contract can be considerably
simplied by using the approximately optimal contract with little loss of e¢ ciency.13
6.2 Approximately Optimal Interest Only Fixed Rate Mortgage (FRM) with
HELOC and Two Way Balance Adjustment
In this section, we consider an implementation of the approximately optimal contract using an interest only
mortgage with HELOC and two way balance adjustment.
Proposition 8 There exists an approximately optimal interest only mortgage with HELOC and two way
balance adjustment that has the following features:
xt = x =  +   a^1; (36)
CLt = C
L = a^1  A; (37)
rt(Bt; rt) =
8>>><>>>:
   (rL)

a A
a^1 a

for Bt 2 [0; B^] and rt = rL
   (rL)

a^1 A Bt
Bt

for Bt 2 [B^; CL] and rt = rL
 + (rH)

a A
a^1 A

for Bt 2 [0; CL] and rt = rH
; (38)
BA(Bt; rt) =
8<:

a A
a^1 a

Bt for Bt 2 [0; B^] and rt = rL
 

a A
a^1 A

Bt for Bt 2 [0; CL] and rt = rH
; (39)
where B^ = a^1   a: Under this mortgage contract, it is incentive compatible for the borrower to refrain from
stealing. Once balance reaches zero, all excess disposable income is consumed by the borrower. Whenever
Bt 2 [B^; CL); an instantaneous change of the interest rate from rL to rH triggers the default of the mortgage.
Under this mortgage, the borrowers expected payo¤, a^t, is determined by the current HELOC balance as
follows:
a^t = A+

CLt (rt) Bt

= a^1  Bt: (40)
Proof Immediately follows from Proposition 5, where the function  is replaced by  ^ and where the
reection barriers a1(r); r 2 frL; rHg ; are replaced by a^1:
The intuition behind incentive compatibility of the postulated strategy of the borrower under the above
mortgage contract is the same as in the case of the optimal mortgage contract of Proposition 5. The coupon
13This result holds across all parameterizations we considered.
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Figure 8: Approximately optimal balance adjustment and the variable interest rate on the HELOC debt.
(36), the HELOC limit (37), the variable interest rate (38), and the HELOC balance adjustment (39) play
the same role in implementing the approximately optimal allocation as their counterparts in Proposition 5
in implementing the optimal allocation.
As we observe from Proposition 8, the approximately optimal interest only mortgage with HELOC takes
the simple form of the interest only xed rate mortgage with constant interest coupon payment of (36). The
HELOC has a constant credit limit given by (37), and a simple variable rate given by (38). It follows from
Proposition 8 that this mortgage contract has the following properties.
Corollary 5 The approximately optimal interest only FRM with HELOC and two way balance adjustment
has the following features:
i) BA(B; rt) = 0 for B = 0, and
BA(B; rL) is positive and strictly increasing in B for B 2 (0; B^];
BA(B; rH) is negative and strictly decreasing in B for B 2 (0; CL];
(ii) rt(B0; rL) <  < rt(B00; rH); for any B0 2 [0; CL]; B00 2 [0; CL]:
As the above corollary shows, under the approximately optimal interest only FRM with HELOC and
two way balance adjustment, a decrease in the interest rate causes a decrease in the borrowers HELOC
balance and vice versa. The magnitude of these adjustments is linearly proportional to the HELOC balance.
The variable interest rate on the HELOC balance positively correlates with the lenders interest rate, and
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is independent of the borrowers debt balance, except the debt region [B^; CL], where the HELOC interest
rate increases with the balance, provided that the lenders interest rate is low (rt = rL). Figure 8 presents
the approximately optimal balance adjustment and the variable interest rate on the HELOC debt in the
parametrized environment of Section 4.3.
6.3 Approximately Optimal Interest Only FRM with HELOC with Preferential
Interest Rate and One Way Balance Adjustment
In this section, we consider an implementation of the approximately optimal allocation by an interest only
mortgage with HELOC with preferential interest rate and one way balance adjustment.
Proposition 9 There exists an approximately optimal interest only FRM with HELOC with preferential
rate, and one way balance adjustment that has the following features:
xt = x =  +   a^1; (41)
CLt (pt) = pt + a^
1  A; (42)
rpt = 0; (43)
rt(Bt   pt; rt) =
8>>><>>>:
   (rL)

a A
a^1 a

for Bt 2 [pt; B^t] and rt = rL
   (rL)

a^1 A Bt+pt
Bt pt

for Bt 2 [B^t; CLt ] and rt = rL
 + (rH)

a A
a^1 A

for Bt 2 [pt; CLt ] and rt = rH
; (44)
dpt =
8<:  

a A
a^1 a

(Bt   pt) for Bt 2 [pt; B^t] and rt = rL
0 for Bt < pt
; (45)
BA (Bt   pt) =  

a A
a^1  A

(Bt   pt); (46)
where B^t = pt + a^1   a: Under this mortgage contract, it is incentive compatible for the borrower to refrain
from stealing. Once the borrowers balance falls to the preferential debt limit, p, all excess disposable income
is consumed by the borrower. Whenever Bt 2 [B^t; CLt (pt)); an instantaneous change of the interest rate from
rL to rH triggers the default of the mortgage. For the balance Bt  pt, the borrowers expected payo¤, a^t, is
determined by the current HELOC balance above the preferential debt limit as follows:
at = A+

CLt (pt; rt) Bt

= a^1   (Bt   pt): (47)
If the amount of debt subject to the preferential rate falls to zero, the mortgage is reset to a contract that
implements the continuation of the approximately optimal allocation.
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Figure 9: The approximately optimal negative balance adjustment and the interest rate on the HELOC
debt.
Proof Immediately follows from Proposition 7 where the function  is replaced by  ^ and the reection
barriers a1(r); r 2 frL; rHg, are replaced by a^1:
The intuition behind incentive compatibility of the postulated strategy of the borrower under the above
mortgage contract is the same as in the case of the optimal mortgage contract of Proposition 6. The coupon
(41), the HELOC limit (42), the interest rates (43) and (44), the preferential debt limit (45), and the negative
balance adjustment (46) play the same role in implementing the approximately optimal allocation as do their
counterparts in Proposition 7 in implementing the optimal allocation.
As we observe from Proposition 9, the approximately optimal interest only mortgage with HELOC with
preferential interest rate and one way balance adjustment takes the simple form of the interest only xed rate
mortgage, with the constant interest coupon payment of (41), combined with the HELOC with the credit
limit of (42) and the simple variable rate given by (43). It follows from Proposition 9 that this mortgage
contract has the following properties.
Corollary 6 The approximately optimal interest only FRM with HELOC with preferential rate and one way
balance adjustment has the following features:
i) BA (Bt   pt) = 0 for Bt = pt, and
BA (Bt   pt) is negative and strictly decreasing in (Bt   pt) for Bt 2 (pt; CLt (rH)];
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 dpt  0 for any Bt  pt; with strict inequality whenever the interest rate, rt, increases and
Bt > pt;
(ii) rt(B0   p0t; rL) <  < rt(B00   p00t ; rH); for any B0 2 [p0t; CLt (rL)]; B00 2 [p00t ; CLt (rH)]:
As the above corollary shows, a decrease in the lenders interest rate causes a decrease in the borrowers
HELOC balance. The magnitude of this adjustment is linearly proportional to the HELOC balance, and,
as before, can be interpreted as o¤ering the borrower an automatic "cramdown" provision. An increase
in the lenders interest rate causes a drop in the amount of debt subject to the preferential interest rate.
Consequently, under this contract, the preferential HELOC debt treatment is reduced over time. The variable
interest rate on the HELOC balance positively correlates with the lenders interest rate, and is independent
of the borrowers debt balance, except the debt region [B^; CL], where the HELOC interest rate increases
with the balance provided that the lenders interest rate is low (rt = rL).
Figure 9 presents the approximately optimal negative balance adjustment and the variable interest rate
on the HELOC debt as a function of the borrowers mortgage debt above the preferential range in the
parametrized environment of Section 4.3.
6.4 Approximately Optimal Option ARM with Preferential Rate
In this section we consider an implementation of the approximately optimal contract by an option ARM.
Proposition 10 There exists an approximately optimal adjustable rate mortgage with preferential interest
rate and negative amortization that has the following features
CLt (pt) = pt + a^
1  A (48)
rpt (pt) =
 +   a^1
pt
(49)
rt(Bt   pt; rt) =
8>>><>>>:
   (rL)

a A
a^1 a

for Bt 2 [pt; B^t] and rt = rL
   (rL)

a^1 A Bt+pt
Bt pt

for Bt 2 [B^t; CLt ] and rt = rL
 + (rH)

a A
a^1 A

for Bt 2 [pt; CLt ] and rt = rH
; (50)
dpt =
8>>><>>>:
 

a A
a^1 a

(Bt   pt) for Bt 2 [pt; B^] and rt = rL
a A
a^1 A

(Bt   pt) for Bt 2 [pt; CLt ] and rt = rH
0 for Bt < pt
; (51)
where B^t = pt + a^1   a: Under the terms of this mortgage, it is incentive compatible for the borrower to
refrain from stealing and maintain balance Bt above pt. The borrower uses all available cash ows to pay
the balance when Bt > pt, and consumes all excess cash ows once the balance drops to pt(rt). Whenever
Bt 2 [B^t; CLt (pt)); an instantaneous change of the interest rate from rL to rH triggers the default of the
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mortgage. For the balance Bt  pt, the borrowers expected payo¤, a^t, is determined by the current HELOC
balance above the preferential debt limit as follows:
a^t = A+ C
L
t  Bt = a^1   (Bt   pt) (52)
If the preferential rate reaches its upper boundary , the mortgage is reset to a contract that implements the
continuation of the approximately optimal allocation.
Proof In the Appendix.
The intuition behind incentive compatibility of the postulated strategy of the borrower under the above
mortgage contract is the same as in the case of the optimal mortgage contract of Proposition 7. The negative
amortization limit (48), the interest rates (49) and (50), and the preferential debt limit (51) play the same
role in implementing the approximately optimal allocation as their counterparts from Proposition 7 do in
implementing the optimal allocation.
Proposition 10 implies the following properties of the above mortgage contract.
Corollary 7 The mortgage contract of Proposition 10 has the following features:
(i) rt(B0   p0t; rL) <  < rt(B00   p00t ; rH); for any B0 2 [p0t; CLt (rL)]; B00 2 [p00t ; CLt (rH)]:
(ii) dpt < 0; dr
p
t > 0 whenever the interest rate, rt; increases and Bt > pt;
dpt > 0; dr
p
t < 0 whenever the interest rate, rt; decreases and Bt > pt;
As the above corollary shows, a decrease in the interest rate causes an increase in the amount of debt
subject to the preferential rate, and a fall in the preferential interest rate and the variable rate charged on
the debt balance above the preferential debt range. An increase in the interest rate causes a drop in the
amount of debt subject to the preferential interest rate, and an increase in the preferential interest rate and
the variable rate charged on the debt balance above the preferential debt range. The variable interest rate
on the debt balance above the preferential debt range does not depend the borrowers debt balance, except
for the debt region [B^; CL], where this interest rate increases with the balance, provided that the market
interest rate is low (rt = rL). The variable interest rate on the debt above the preferential debt limit, in the
parametrized example of Section 4.3, is the same as shown on the right hand side of Figure 9.
7 Concluding Remarks
Recent years have seen a rapid growth in originations of more sophisticated alternative mortgage prod-
ucts (AMPs), such as option adjustable rate mortgages (option ARMs) and interest only mortgages. Critics
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of AMPs point out that they seem to be more protable for lenders than traditional mortgages. They con-
clude that AMPs allow lenders to proteer at the expense of homeowners. However, this paper shows that
the properties of AMPs are consistent with the properties of the optimal allocation governing the relationship
between the borrower and the lender, which represents a Pareto improvement over traditional mortgages. As
a consequence, it is possible that both lenders and borrowers can benet from AMPs. Critics of AMPs have
raised the concern that teaser rates and low minimum payments can result in substantially higher mortgage
payments and, as a consequence, higher default rates when the market interest rate increases. Nevertheless,
this paper demonstrates that this does not necessarily contradict the optimality of AMPs. Under the optimal
mortgage contract, mortgage payments and default rates are indeed higher when the market interest rate
is high. However, borrowers benet from low mortgage payments and low default rates when the market
interest rate is low.
In this paper, we ignored ination, which is an important consideration for home buyers choosing between
ARMs and FRMs.14 However, as long as ination a¤ects the borrowers income and the liquidation value of
the home equally, it would not change the properties of the optimal mortgage in real terms. We also did not
allow for contract renegotiations, because a possibility of renegotiation would lead to a suboptimal contract.
In practice, lenders should be able to commit to the terms of a mortgage contract, or make renegotiation
very costly for borrowers.
For the sake of tractability of our dynamic contracting problem, we had to assume risk-neutrality of the
borrower and the lender. The properties of the optimal mortgage are determined by the conict of interest
between the borrower and the lender and by the gains from trade based on the di¤erences between the
borrowers and the lenders discount factors. We conjecture that the properties of the optimal mortgage will
be preserved if we allow for risk-aversion in our model. However, solving the model with risk-aversion would
require development of completely new dynamic
ing techniques.
There are a number of research directions one might pursue from here. In this paper we have considered
time-homogeneous setting, in which agents are innitely lived and the borrowers average income and the
liquidation values of the home do not change over time. Relaxing this assumptions would allow us to study
the e¤ects of home appreciation trends and householdslife-cycle income proles on optimal mortgage design.
Another avenue of research would be to extend our analysis to a general equilibrium framework and to study
what e¤ects the presence of private information in the mortgage origination market have on equilibrium
home prices, and how this varies over the business cycle.
14See, for example, Campbell and Cocco (2003).
41
Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1
Consider any incentive compatible allocation ( ; I; C; Y^ ). We prove the lemma by showing the existence of
the new incentive-compatible allocation that that has the following properties:
(i) the borrower gets the same expected utility as under the old allocation ( ; I),
(ii) the borrower chooses to reveal the cash ows truthfully,
(iii) the borrower maintains zero savings,
(iv) the lender gets the same or greater expected prot as under the old allocation ( ; I).
Consider the candidate incentive compatible allocation ( 0; I 0; C; Y ) where
 0(Y; r) = (Y^ (Y; r); r);
I 0(Y; r) = C(Y; r):
We observe that the borrowers consumption and the termination time under the new allocation and the
proposed borrowers response strategy, (C; Y ); are the same as under the old allocation, so he earns the same
payo¤, which establishes property (i). Also, by construction, the proposed response of the borrower to the
allocation ( 0; I 0) involves truth-telling and zero savings, which establishes properties (ii) and (iii).
Now we will show that (C; Y ) is the borrowers incentive compatible strategy under the allocation ( 0; I 0):
We note that the strategy (C; Y ) yields the same utility to the borrower under the allocation ( 0; I 0) as
the incentive compatible strategy associated with the allocation ( ; I). Therefore, to show that (C; Y ) is
the borrowers incentive compatible strategy under the allocation ( 0; I 0); it is enough to show that if any
alternative strategy (C 0; Y 0) is feasible under the allocation ( 0; I 0), then C 0 is also feasible under the old
allocation ( ; I).
It follows that if C 0 is feasible under the new allocation, then the borrower has nonnegative savings if
he reports Y^ (Y 0(Y; r); r) and consumes C 0 under the old allocation, and thus C 0 is also feasible under the
old allocation ( ; I): To see this we note that that the borrowers savings at any time t  (Y^ (Y 0(Y; r); r) =
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 0(Y 0(Y; r); r) under the old allocation ( ; I) and the borrowers strategy (C 0; Y^ (Y 0(Y; r); r)) are equal to
tZ
0
et(t s)
h
dYs   dY^s(Y 0(Y; r); r) + dIs(Y^ (Y 0(Y; r); r)  dC 0s(Y; r)
i
| {z }
=
Savings under the old allocation, the borrowers strategy (C0;Y^ (Y 0(Y;r);r)), and the realized (Y; r)
tZ
0
et(t s)
h
dY 0s (Y; r)  dY^s(Y 0(Y; r); r) + dIs(Y^ (Y 0(Y; r); r)  dCs(Y 0(Y; r); r)
i
| {z }
(0) Savings under the old allocation given the borrowers strategy (C;Y^ (Y 0(Y;r);r)), and the realized (Y 0(Y;r);r)
+
tZ
0
et(t s)
264dYs   dY 0s (Y; r) + dCs(Y 0(Y; r); r)| {z }
=I0(Y 0(Y;r);r)
  dC 0s(Y; r)
375
| {z }
(0) Savings under the new allocation, the borrowers strategy (C;Y 0(Y;r)), and the realized (Y; r)
 0:
Finally, to complete the proof, we need to show that under the new allocation ( 0; I 0) the lender gets the
same or greater expected prot as under the allocation ( ; I). Note that under the new allocation the lender
does savings for the borrower. As by assumption the lenders interest rate process is always greater or equal
from the savings interest rate available to the borrower (i.e., for all t; rt  t); the lenders expected prot
improves by
E0
24 Z
0
e Rt (rt   t)Stdt
35  0;
which shows (iv). 
Proof of Proposition 3
First let b(a; r) be a concave function15 that solves the second-order di¤erential equation of the proposition,
i.e.:
rb(a; r) = (53)
+ (a      (a; r)(r))b0(at; rt) + 1
2
2b00(a; r) + (rt) (b(at +  (a; r); rc)  b(a; r))
when a is in the interval [A; a1(r)]; and b0(a; r) =  1 when a > a1(r), with boundary conditions b(A; r) = L
and
+  = rLb(a
1(rL); rL) + a
1(rL)  (rL)

b(a1(rH); rH)  b(a1(rL); rL) + a1(rH)  a1(rL)

;
+  = rHb(a
1(rH); rH) + a
1(rH)  (rH)

b(a1(rL); rL)  b(a1(rH); rH) + a1(rL)  a1(rH)

;
15We establish concavity of the lenders value function in a discrete time approximation to our model. See Appendix A.2.
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where function  is dened as follows
 (a; r) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
is a solution to b0(a; r) = b0(a+  ; rc) for all (a; r)
for which the solution is such that  (a; r) > A  a;
otherwise it is equal to A  a:
;
where r 2 frL; rHg and rc = frL; rHg n frg :
For any incentive compatible allocation ( ; I; C; Y ) we dene:
Gt =
tZ
0
e Rs(dYs   dIs) + e Rtb(at; rt); (54)
where at evolves according to (6). We note that the process G is such that Gt is Ft measurable.
We remember that under an arbitrary incentive compatible allocation, ( ; I; C; Y ), at evolves as
dat(rt) = (at       t(rt)) dt  dIt + tdZt +  tdNt:
where t   m-a.s. for any 0  t   . From Itos lemma we get that
db(at; rt) =

(at       t(rt))b0(at; rt) +
1
2
2t b
00(at; rt)

dt  b0(at; rt)dIt
+tb
0(at; rt)dZt + [b(at +  t; r
c
t )  b(at; rt)] dNt:
Then combining the above with (54) yields
eRtdGt =

+ (at       t(rt))b1(at; rt) +
1
2
2t b2(at; rt)  rtb1(at; rt)

dt
 (1 + b1(at; rt))dIt + ( + tb1(at; rt)) dZt + [b(at +  t; rct )  b(at; rt)] dNt
Combining the above with (53) yields
eRtdGt 

1
2
 
2t   2

b00(at; rt) + (rt)b0(at; rt) [ (at; rt)   t]

dt  (1 + b0(at; rt))dIt
+( + tb
0(at; rt)) dZt + [b(at +  t; r
c
t )  b(at +  (at; rt); rct )] dNt;
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with equality whenever a 2 [A; a1(rt)]: From the above we have that for any 0  t <  :
eRtdGt 

1
2
 
2t   2

b00(at; rt)

| {z }
0
dt (1 + b0(at; rt))dIt| {z }
0
+(rt) ([b(at +  t; r
c
t )   tb0(at; rt)]  [b(at +  (at; rt); rct )   (at; rt)b0(at; rt)])| {z }
0
dt
+( + tb
0(at; rt)) dZt + [b(at +  t; r
c
t )  b(at +  (at; rt); rct )] dMt; (55)
with equality whenever a 2 [A; a1(rt)]: The rst component of the RHS of the above inequality is less or
equal to zero because the function b is concave and t   for any t   : The second component is less
or equal to zero because b0   1 and dIt  0: The third component is less or equal to zero because, by
denition, the function  is a solution to
max
 A a
[b(a+  ; rc)   b0(a; r))] :
The condition (55) implies that the process G is an Ft supermartingale up to time t =  , where we recall
that Z and M are martingales. It will be an Ft martingale if and only if, for t > 0; at  a1(rt); t = 
m-a.s.,  t =  (at; rt); and It is increasing only when at  a1(rt).
We now evaluate the lenders payo¤ for an arbitrary incentive compatible allocation ( ; I; C; Y ), which
equals
E
24 Z
0
e Rs(dYs   dIs) + e RL
35 :
We note that b(a ; r ) = L as, from the denition of a; a = A: Using this, and the denition of process G;
we have that under any arbitrary incentive compatible allocation ( ; I; C; Y ) and any t 2 [0;1):
E
24 Z
0
e Rs(dYs   dIs) + e RL
35 =
E [Gt^ ] + E
241t
0@ Z
t
e Rs(dYs   dIs) + e RL  e Rtb(at; rt)
1A35 
b(a0; r0) + E
241t
0@ Z
t
e Rs(dYs   dIs) + e RL  e Rtb(at; rt)
1A35 =
b(a0; r0) + e
 RtE
241t
0@E
24 Z
t
eRt Rs(dYs   dIs) + eRt RL jFt
35  b(at; rt)
1A35 ; (56)
where, the inequality follows from the fact that Gt^ is supermartingale and G0 = b(a0; r0): We note that
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in the above
E
24 Z
t
eRt Rs(dYs   dIs) + eRt RL jFt
35 < 
rL
+


  at;
as the RHS of the above inequality is the upper bound on the lenders expected prot under the rst-best
(public information) allocation. Using the above inequality in (56) we have that
E
24 Z
0
e Rs(dYs   dIs) + e RL
35  b(a0; r0) + e RtE 1t  
rL
+


  at   b(at; rt)

:
Using b0(a; r)   1, we have that, for any a  A;  a   b(a; r)   A   L. Applying this to the above
inequality yields
E
24 Z
0
e Rs(dYs   dIs) + e RL
35  b(a0; r0) + e RtE 1t  
rL
+


 A  L

:
Taking t!1 yields
E
24 Z
0
e Rs(dYs   dIs) + e RL
35  b(a0; r0):
Let (; I; C; Y ) be an allocation satisfying the conditions of the proposition. We remember that this
allocation is incentive compatible as it is feasible and t =    for any t   . Also under this allocation
the process Gt is a martingale until time  (note that b0(a; r) is bounded). So we have that
E
24Z
0
e Rs(dYs   dIs ) + e RL
35 =
b(a0; r0) + e
 RtE
241t
0@E
24Z
t
eRt Rs(dYs   dIs ) + eRt RL jFt
35  b(at; rt)
1A35 :
Taking t!1 and using
lim
t!1e
 RtE
241t
0@E
24Z
t
eRt Rs(dYs   dIs ) + eRt RL jFt
35  b(at; rt)
1A35 = 0;
yields
E
24Z
0
e Rs(dYs   dIs ) + e RL
35 = b(a0; r0): 
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Proof of Proposition 4
Let (C; Y^ ) be any borrowers feasible strategy given the allocation ( ; I). The borrowers private savings
account balance, S, under the strategy (C; Y^ ) and the allocation ( ; I) grows, for t 2 [0;  ]; according to
dSt = tStdt+ (dYt   dY^t) + dIt   dCt; (57)
where we remember that t  rt: Dene the process V^ as
V^t =
tZ
0
e sdCs +
tZ
0
e sds+ e t(St + at);
From the above it follows that
etdV^t = dCt + dt+ dSt   Stdt+ dat   atdt
Using (16) and (57) yields
etdV^t = (t   )Stdt+ (dYt   dt)dt+  tdMt =
(t   )Stdt+ dZt +  tdMt: (58)
Noting that et  1 for any t  0, we have that
dV^t  (t   )Stdt+ dZt +  tdMt:
Recall that Z and M are martingales, t < , and that the process S is nonnegative. So it follows from the
above that the process V^ is supermartingale up to time  (note that a is bounded from below). Using this
and the fact that by denition a = A; we have that for any feasible strategy of the borrower,
a0 = V^0  E
h
V^
i
= E
24 Z
0
e sdCs +
Z
0
e sds+ e  (S +A)
35 ; (59)
The right-hand-side of (59) represents the expected future payo¤ for the borrower under any feasible
C; Y^ ; S

. This payo¤ is bounded by a0. If the borrower maintains zero savings, St = 0, reports cash
ows truthfully, dY^t = dYt, then V^ is a martingale up to time  , which means that (59) holds with equality
and the borrowers expected future payo¤ is a0. Thus, this is the optimal strategy for the borrower. 
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Proof of Proposition 5
Consider the candidate mortgage contract. Under this contract the borrowers balance on the credit line
evolves according to
dBt = rt(Bt; rt)Btdt+ xt(rt)dt  (dY^t   dIt) +BA(Bt; rt)dNt; (60)
when Bt  CLt (rt); while the borrowers savings evolve according to
dSt = tStdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

  dCt; (61)
where It represents cumulative withdrawal of money from the credit line by the borrower.
Let (C; Y^ ; S) be any borrowers feasible strategy under the proposed mortgage contract. For any feasible
borrowers strategy (C; Y^ ; S) dene a process V^ as
V^t =
tZ
0
e s(dCs + ds) + e t (~at + St) ; (62)
where
~at = a
1(rt) Bt (63)
It follows from (60), (63), and (17)-(20) that ~a evolves as
d~at =

a1(rct )  a1(rt)

dNt   dBt
=

a1(rct )  a1(rt)

dNt   rt(Bt; rt)Btdt  xt(Bt; rt)dt BA(Bt; rt)dNt + dY^t   dIt
=

a1(rct )  a1(rt)

dNt  


 
a1(rt)  ~at
  (rt)  (a1(rt); rt)   (~at; rt) dt
   +   a1(rt) + (rt) (a1(rt); rt) dt    (~at; rt) + (a1(rct )  a1(rt)) dNt
+dY^t   dIt
= (~at      (rt) (~at; rt)) dt+ (dY^t   dt)  dIt +  (~at; rt)dNt (64)
Using (1), (61), (62), (64) yields
etdV^t = dCt + dt+ d~at + dSt   ~atdt  Stdt
= dZt +  (~at; rt)dMt + (t   )Stdt
Recall that Z and M are martingales, t < , and that the process S is nonnegative. So it follows from
the above that the process V^ is a supermartingale up to time 

C; Y^ ; S

= inf

t : Bt = C
L
t
	
(note that ~a
is bounded from below). Using this and the fact that by denition ~a = A; we have that for any feasible
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strategy of the borrower, (C; Y^ ; S);
A+ CL0(r0) B0 = a0 = ~a0 = V^0  E
h
V^(C;Y^ ;S)
i
= E
264
(C;Y^ ;S)Z
0
e s(dCs + ds) + e (C;Y^ ;S)(S(C;Y^ ;S) +A)
375 (65)
The right-hand-side of (65) represents the expected future payo¤ for the borrower under any feasible strategy
C; Y^ ; S

, given the terms of the mortgage. This payo¤ is bounded by A + CL0 (r0)   B0; where B0 is
the initial draw on the credit line. If the borrower maintains zero savings, St = 0, reports cash ows
truthfully, dY^t = dYt, and consumes all excess cash ows once the balance on the credit line reaches 0, so
that C = I = I = max(0; Bt) = max(0; ~at   a1(rt)); then V^ is a martingale, which means that (65)
holds with equality and the borrowers expected future payo¤ is A+CL0 (r0) B0. Thus, this is the optimal
strategy for the borrower.
Reproducing the above argument for the borrowers optimal strategy, (C; Y^ ; S) = (I; Y; 0); and the
process V^t0 , t0  (I; Y; 0); dened as
V^t0;t =
tZ
t0
e (s t
0)(dCs + ds) + e
 (t t0)~at; t  t0; (66)
yields that, for any 0  t  (I; Y; 0); ~at is equal to the borrowers continuation payo¤ under the proposed
mortgage contract with the initial payo¤ for the borrower given by a0 = A+CL0 (r0) B0, which establishes
(21).
Under the proposed mortgage contract and the borrowers optimal strategy, the lenders payo¤ equals
E
264(I
;Y;0)Z
0
e Rt(dYt   dIt ) + e R(I;Y;0)(I
;Y;0)L jF0
375 ;
where
(I; Y; 0) = inf

t : Bt = C
L
t
	
= inf ft : ~at = Ag = (Y );
as the borrowers continuation payo¤, ~a, evolve according to the equation (64), e.g. as in the optimal allo-
cation. Therefore, we conclude that the proposed mortgage contract implements the optimal allocation. 
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Proof of Proposition 6
Dene ~at as follows:
~at = A+ C
L
t (rt) Bt (67)
= pt + a
1(rt) Bt: (68)
Under the candidate mortgage contract the balance on the HELOC evolves according to
dBt =

rptBt + (rt   rpt ) (Bt   pt)+

dt+ xt(rt)dt+BA
 (Bt   pt)dNt   dY^t + dIt (69)
when Bt  CLt , where It represents cumulative withdrawal of money from the credit line by the borrower.
In addition,
dCLt = dpt + da
1(rt)
=

 (a1(rt)  (Bt   pt; rt)Irt =rL + da1(rt)Irt =rH

dNt (70)
Using (68)-(70) and (22)-(27), for Bt  pt, we can write
d~at = dC
L
t (rt)  dBt
=

 (pt + a
1(rt) Bt; rt)Irt =rLdNt + da1(rt)Irt =rH

dNt   (rptBt + (rt   rpt ) (Bt   pt)) dt
 xt(rt) BA (Bt   pt)dNt + dY^t   dIt
=

 (pt + a
1(rt) Bt; rt)Irt =rLdNt + da1(rt)Irt =rH

dNt   (rptBt + (rt   rpt ) (Bt   pt)) dt
 xt(rt)  (  (pt + a1(rt) Bt; rt)Irt =rH dNt + da1(rt)Irt =rH )dNt + dY^t   dIt
=     +   a1(rt) +  (Bt   pt) dt+ dY^t   dIt +  (pt + a1(rt) Bt; rt)dMt
= ~atdt  dt  dt+ dY^t   dIt +  (~at; rt)dMt (71)
The borrowers savings evolve according to
dSt = tStdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

  dCt: (72)
Consider
V^t =
Z t
0
e s (dt+ dCs) + e t (
t + St)
where

t =
8<: a1 (rt) + (pt  Bt) ; if Bt < pt~at; if Bt  pt : (73)
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We will show that for any feasible strategy

C; Y^ ; S

of the borrower, V^t is a supermartingale. Note that
d
t =
8>><>>:
[a1(rct )  a1(rt)]| {z }
 (a1(rt);rt)
dNt   dBt; if Bt < pt
d~at; if Bt  pt
: (74)
Using (72),
etdV^t = dt+ dCt + dSt   Stdt+ d
t   
tdt
= dt  (   t)Stdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

+ d
t   
tdt:
First, we consider the case with Bt  pt. Using (1), (71), (73)-(74),
etdV^t = dt  (   t)Stdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

+ d~at   ~atdt
= (t   )Stdt+ dZt +  (~at; rt)dMt: (75)
Now, let Bt < pt. Using (1), (22)-(26), (69)-(74) yields
etdV^t = dt  (   t)Stdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

+ (a1(rt); rt)dNt   dBt   
 
a1 (rt) + (pt  Bt)

dt
= dt  (   t)Stdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

+ (a1(rt); rt)dNt
 
h
rptBt + (rt   rpt ) (Bt   pt)+

dt+ xt(rt)dt+BA
 (Bt   pt)dNt   dY^t + dIt
i
   a1 (rt) + (pt  Bt) dt
= dt  (   t)Stdt+ dYt
+ (a1(rt); rt)dNt   [ +   a1(rt) + (rt) (a1(rt); rt)]dt
   a1 (rt) + (pt  Bt) dt
=   (pt  Bt) dt  (   t)Stdt+  (a1(rt); rt)dMt + dZt (76)
Recall that Z and M are martingales and that t < . Thus, it follows from (75), (76), and the fact that
~at is bounded from below, that for any feasible strategy

C; Y^ ; S

of the borrower V^t is a supermartingale
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until default time 

C; Y^ ; S

= inf

t : Bt = C
L
t
	
. Since 
 = A,
A+ CL0 (r0) B0 = ~a0 + S0 = V^0  E
h
V^(C;Y^ ;S)
i
= E
"Z (C;Y^ ;S)
0
e s (dt+ dCs) + e (Y^ ;C;S)

A+ S(C;Y^ ;S)
#
; (77)
where B0 is the time-zero draw on the credit line.
The right-hand-side of (77) represents the expected future payo¤for the borrower under strategy

C; Y^ ; S

,
given the terms of the mortgage. This payo¤ is bounded by A+CL0 (r0) B00+S0. If the borrower maintains
zero savings, St = 0, reports cash ows truthfully, dY^t = dYt, and consumes all excess cash ows once the
balance on the credit line reaches pt(rt), so that Bt  pt and Ct = It = max(0; pt   Bt) = max(0; ~at   a1t );
then V^t is a martingale, which means that (88) holds with equality and the borrowers expected future payo¤
is A+ CL0 (r0) B0. Thus, this is the optimal strategy for the borrower.
Reproducing the above argument for the borrowers optimal strategy, (C; Y^ ; S) = (I; Y; 0), and the
process V^t0 , t0  (I; Y; 0); dened in (66) yields that, for any 0  t  (C; Y^ ; 0); ~at is equal to the
borrowers continuation payo¤ under the proposed mortgage contract with the initial payo¤ for the borrower
given by a0 = A+ CL0 (r0) B0, which establishes (28).
Under the proposed mortgage contract and the borrowers optimal strategy (C; Y^ ; S) = (I; Y; 0), the
lenders payo¤ equals
E
264(I
;Y;0)Z
0
e Rt(dYt   dIt ) + e R(I;Y;0)(I
;Y;0)L jF0
375 ;
where
(I; Y; 0) = inf

t : Bt = C
L
t
	
= inf ft : ~at = Ag = (Y );
as the borrowers continuation payo¤, ~a, evolve according to the equation (71), e.g. as in the optimal allo-
cation. Therefore, we conclude that the proposed mortgage contract implements the optimal allocation. 
Proof of Proposition 7
Dene ~at as follows:
~at = A+ C
L
t (rt) Bt (78)
= pt + a
1(rt) Bt: (79)
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Under the candidate mortgage contract the debt balance evolves according to
dBt =

rptBt + (rt   rpt ) (Bt   pt)+

dt  dY^t + dIt; (80)
when Bt  CLt , where It represents cumulative withdrawal of money by the borrower. In addition,
dCLt = dpt + da
1(rt)
=  (pt + a
1(rt) Bt; rt)dNt (81)
Using (29)-(31), (79)-(81), for Bt  pt we can write
d~at = dC
L
t (rt)  dBt
=  (pt + a
1(rt) Bt; rt)dNt   (rptBt + (rt   rpt ) (Bt   pt)) dt+ dY^t   dIt
=    rpt pt + rt (Bt   pt)   (pt + a1(rt) Bt; rt) dt+ dY^t   dIt
+ (pt + a
1(rt) Bt; rt)dMt
=     +   a1(rt) +  (Bt   pt) dt+ dY^t   dIt +  (pt + a1(rt) Bt; rt)dMt
= ~atdt  dt  dt+ dY^t   dIt +  (~at; rt)dMt (82)
The borrowers savings evolve according to
dSt = tStdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

  dCt: (83)
Consider
V^t =
Z t
0
e s (dt+ dCs) + e t (
t + St)
where

t =
8<: a1 (rt) + (pt  Bt) ; if Bt < pt~at; if Bt  pt : (84)
We will show that for any feasible strategy

C; Y^ ; S

of the borrower, V^t is a supermartingale. Note that
d
t =
8>><>>:

a1(rct )  a1(rt)
| {z }
 (a1(rt);rt)
dNt   dBt; if Bt < pt
d~at; if Bt  pt
: (85)
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Using (83),
etdV^t = dt+ dCt + dSt   Stdt+ d
t   
tdt
= dt  (   t)Stdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

+ d
t   
tdt:
First, we consider the case with Bt  pt. Using (1), (82), and (84)-(85),
etdV^t = dt  (   t)Stdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

+ d~at   ~atdt
= (t   )Stdt+ dZt +  (~at; rt)dMt: (86)
Now, let Bt < pt. Using (1), (30), (80)-(85) yields
etdV^t = dt  (   t)Stdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

+ d
t   
tdt
= dt  (   t)Stdt+ dIt +

dYt   dY^t

+ (a1(rt); rt)dNt   dBt   
 
a1 (rt) + (pt  Bt)

dt
=    rptBt +  (pt  Bt) + a1 (rt)     + (   t)St dt
+ (a1(rt); rt)dNt + dZt
=    rptBt +  (pt  Bt)  rpt pt +  (a1(rt); rt) + (   t)St dt
+ (a1(rt); rt)dNt + dZt
=   (   rpt ) (pt  Bt) dt  (   t)Stdt+  (a1(rt); rt)dMt + dZt (87)
Recall that Z and M are martingales, rpt  , t < . Thus, it follows from (86), (87), and the fact that
~at is bounded from below, that for any feasible strategy

C; Y^ ; S

of the borrower V^t is a supermartingale
until default time 

C; Y^ ; S

= inf

t : Bt = C
L
t
	
. Since 
 = A,
A+ CL0 (r0) B0 = ~a0 = V^0  E
h
V^(C;Y^ ;S)
i
= E
"Z (C;Y^ ;S)
0
e s (dt+ dCs) + e (C;Y^ ;S)

A+ S(C;Y^ ;S)
#
; (88)
where B0 is the time-zero draw on the credit line.
The right-hand-side of (88) represents the expected future payo¤for the borrower under strategy

C; Y^ ; S

,
given the terms of the mortgage. This payo¤ is bounded by A + CL0 (r0)   B0. If the borrower maintains
zero savings, St = 0, reports cash ows truthfully, dY^t = dYt, and consumes all excess cash ows once the
balance on the credit line reaches pt(rt), so that Bt  pt and Ct = It = max(0; pt   Bt) = max(0; ~at   a1t );
then V^t is a martingale, which means that (88) holds with equality and the borrowers expected future payo¤
is A+ CL0 (r0) B0. Thus, this is the optimal strategy for the borrower.
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Reproducing the above argument for the borrowers optimal strategy, (C; Y^ ; S) = (I; Y; 0), and the
process V^t0 , t0  (I; Y; 0); dened in (66) yields that, for any 0  t  (C; Y^ ; 0); ~at is equal to the
borrowers continuation payo¤ under the proposed mortgage contract with the initial payo¤ for the borrower
given by a0 = A+ CL0 (r0) B0, which establishes (33).
Under the proposed mortgage contract and the borrowers optimal strategy (C; Y^ ; S) = (I; Y; 0), the
lenders payo¤ equals
E
264(I
;Y;0)Z
0
e Rt(dYt   dIt ) + e R(I;Y;0)(I
;Y;0)L jF0
375 ;
where
(I; Y; 0) = inf

t : Bt = C
L
t
	
= inf ft : ~at = Ag = (Y );
as the borrowers continuation payo¤, ~a, evolve according to the equation (82), e.g. as in the optimal allo-
cation. Therefore, we conclude that the proposed mortgage contract implements the optimal allocation. 
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A.2 Discrete-Time Formulation
In this section we present a discrete-time version of our model.
Set-up
Time is discrete and the period has a length equal to  > 0: There is one borrower and one lender. lender
is risk neutral, have unlimited capital, and values a stochastic cash ow sequence fCtg as
X
t
E

e RtCt

.
We assume that Rt =
tX
s=1
rs, where frtg is the lenders stochastic discount rate sequence (interest rate
sequence). The lenders stochastic discount rate sequence is a rst-order time-invariant Markov chain. We
further assume that, for any t; rt 2 frL; rHg ; 0  rL < rH ;
Pr [rt+1 = rL jrt = rL ] = e (rL);
Pr [rt+1 = rH jrt = rH ] = e (rH);
Note that this implies that P [rt+1 = rL jrt = rH ] = 1  e (rH) and P [rt+1 = rH jrt = rL ] = 1  e (rL):
The borrower is also risk neutral, has limited wealth, and values a stochastic cash ow sequence fCtg
as
X
t
e tE [Ct]. We assume that, for all t;   rt. The borrower can buy a home at date t = 0; which
requires an initial investment in assets of P: The borrower initial wealth is Y0  0. We assume that P > Y0,
so that the borrower must borrow from the lender (sign a contract with the lender) to nance the purchase
of a home. In every period, the home ownership generates to the borrower a public deterministic utility
stream equal to ftg.
The borrowers income at date t is given by a random variable Yt 2 Yt. The borrowers income realizations,
fYtg; are jointly independent and Es[Yt] = E[Yt] = t for all s < t . We note that the independence
assumption implies no learning about future income ows. For all t, denote the minimum element of the
support of Yt by Y 0t  0: The minimal cash ow Y 0t is collectible by the lender. The excess income realizations
Yt   Y 0t ; are privately observable by the borrower.
The borrower also maintains a private savings account. The borrowers balance grows at the interest rate
t; such that t  rL. The borrower must maintain a nonnegative balance at his account.
At any time the lender can liquidate the project. In case of liquidation at time t, the lender receives Lt,
while the borrower receives his time-t reservation value equal to At:
Optimal Contract (Optimal Allocation)
If the lender agrees to fund the project at date 0; the borrower and the lender sign a contract that will
govern their relationship until time T: Let Y^t be a borrowers report of cash ow realization at time t and
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Figure 10: Sequence of events.
let Y^ t =
n
Y^0; :::; Y^t
o
be the history of borrowers reports up to time t. Let rt = fr0; r1; :::; rtg be the history
of interest rates. Consequently we have the following denition.
Denition 13 A contract  = (p; I) is a sequence of two functions fpt; ItgTt=0, such that, given the history
of borrowers reports of income, Y^ t =
n
Y^0; :::; Y^t
o
; and the history of interest rates, rt = fr0; r1; :::; rtg ;
the contract obliges lender to make, at any time t; payment It(Y^ t; rt)  0 and liquidate the project with the
probability pt(Y^ t; rt) 2 [0; 1].
Figure 10 presents the sequence of events.
The borrower can misreport his income. Consequently, under the contract  = (p; I); the borrowers
income at time t equals
(Yt   Y^t)| {z }
misreporting
+ It;
The borrowers private savings account balance, S, grows according to
St+1 = e
tSt + (Yt   Y^t) + It   Ct;
where Ct is the borrowers consumption at time t; which must be nonnegative. We remember that, for all
t  0; St  0 and t  rt:
Denition 14 Given a contract  = (p; I); the borrowers strategy is a consumption-report pair (C; Y^ ) =n
Ct; Y^t
oT
t=0
, such that, given the history of the borrowers income realizations, Y t, and the history of interest
rates, rt; the borrower consumes Ct(Y t; rt) and reports Y^t(Y t; rt) at time t:
Denition 15 Given a contract  = (p; I); the borrowers strategy, (C; Y^ ); is feasible if the borrowers
consumption and savings are nonnegative under this strategy.
Let
Pt(Y^
t; rt) =
8>><>>:
1 for t = 0
t 1Y
k=1
(1  pk(Y^ k; rk)) for t  1
;
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be the probability that the project is active at the beginning of period t under the contract  = (p; I); given
the history of reports, Y^ t; and the history of interest rates, rt:
Denition 16 A contract  = (p; I) together with the borrowers strategy (C; Y^ ) is incentive compatible if:
(i) given a contract  = (p; I); the borrowers strategy (C; Y^ ) is feasible,
(ii) given a contract  = (p; I); the borrowers strategy (C; Y^ ) provides him with the highest expected utility
among all feasible strategies, i.e.:
E
"
TX
t=0
e tPt(Y^ t; rt)
h
Ct(Y
t; rt) + t + pt(Y^
t; rt)At
i
jr0
#

E
"
TX
t=0
e tPt(Y^ 0t; rt)
h
C 0t(Y
t; rt) + t + pt(Y^
0t; rt)At
i
jr0
#
for any feasible strategy (C 0; Y^ 0) given a contract  = (p; I);
(iii) the borrowers continuation payo¤ under the contract  = (p; I) and the strategy (C; bY ) is greater or
equal from the payo¤ he could guarantee himself by leaving the contract, e.g., for any (Y s; rs); such
that the contract has not been terminated at time s  T :
E
"
TX
t=s+1
e (s t)Pt(Y^ t; rt)
h
Ct(Y
t; rt) + t + pt(Y^
t; rt)At
i
j(Y s; rs)
#
 As:
Denition 17 Given the borrowers initial utility, a0, and the initial interest rate for the lender, r0, the
contract,  = (p; I); together with the recommendation to the borrower, (C; Y^ ); is optimal if it maximizes
the lenders payo¤:
E
"
TX
t=0
e RtPt(Y^ t; rt)

Y^ t   It (Y^ t; rt) + pt (Y^ t; rt)Lt

jr0
#
in the class of all incentive-compatible contracts that satisfy the following promise keeping constraint:
a0 = E
"
TX
t=0
e tP t (bY t; rt) hCt (Y t; rt) + t + pt (bY t; rt)Ati jr0
#
As we will see, in the search for an optimal contract, we can focus our attention on the direct-revelation
contracts with no private savings by the borrower. The reasoning behind this result is simple. Consider any
contract such that the borrowers optimal response entails concealing cash ows (Y^t  Yt). We can design
a new contract in which the borrower gives the diverted cash ows to the lender (Y^t = Yt), and the lender
then pays the borrower (through It) an amount equal to (Yt   Y^t). Similarly, rather than privately save,
the borrower can give income to the lender, and receive it back in the future with interest t. This leaves
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the borrowers utility unchanged, but leads to a weakly higher payo¤ for the lender since private savings are
ine¢ cient (as t  rL < rH). This leads us to the following result.
Lemma 4 Let (; C; Y^ ) be an incentive compatible contract with an borrowers strategy. Then there exists
an incentive compatible contract with an borrowers strategy ( 0; C 0; Y^ 0) such that:
- the borrowers payo¤ under the contract  0 is the same as under the contract ,
- the lenders payo¤ under the contract  0 is weakly higher from those under the contract ,
- the borrower reports its income truthfully and maintains no savings under the contract  0:
Recursive Formulation of the Contracting Problem
We formulate recursively the contracting problem using dynamic programming approach similarly to De-
Marzo and Fishman (2004). First, we characterize an optimal contract under the assumption that private
saving is impossible. We know from Lemma 4, that it is su¢ cient to look for the optimal contracts in which
the borrower reports truthfully and maintains zero savings. But this implies that the optimal contract in
the environment with no private savings yields to the lender, for a given promise to the borrower, at least as
much prot as the optimal contract of the problem when borrower is allowed to privately save. Finally, we
will show that, given the optimal contract of the relaxed problem, the borrower has no incentive to save at
the solution, and thus this contract is also optimal in the environment with private savings by the borrower.
Consider the subgame that begins at the end of period t in which interest for the lender equals rt. For
this subgame, let t denote a contract governing the relationship between lenders and the borrower, and
let Y^t be a report strategy for the borrower, At and Bt be the continuation payo¤s, respectively, to the
borrower, and to the lender. Dene  t(rt) to be the set of incentive compatible contract strategy pairs.
Because cash ows are independent over time, and for a moment we assume there is no private savings, the
set of incentive compatible contract strategy pairs  t(rt) are common knowledge at time t and independent
of the prior history. This allows us, along the lines of Spear and Srivastava (1987), Green (1987), and Abreu
et al. (1990), to characterize the optimal contract by using the borrowers continuation utility as a state
variable.
Dene the payo¤ possibility set as
t(rt) =
n
(a; b)
a = At(t; Y^t); b = At(t; Y^t) for some (t; Y^t) 2  t(rt)o :
This set describes the payo¤ combinations that can be achieved by operating the project beyond date t. The
payo¤ combinations, corresponding to optimal contracts, are on the frontier of this set, and can be described
by the end-of-period continuation payo¤ function, that is the continuation payo¤ for the lender, as a function
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Figure 11: Continuation functions.
of the borrowers continuation payo¤
bet (a; rt) = max fb j(a; b) 2 t(rt)g
For each period, we consider the start-of-period, the intra-period (just prior to the termination deci-
sion), and the end-of-period continuation functions for the lender, denoted by, respectively, byt (a
y
t (rt); rt),
bdt (a
d
t (rt); rt); b
e
t (a
e
t (rt); rt), where a
y
t (rt); a
d
t (rt); and a
e
t (rt) denote the borrowers continuation payo¤s at the
start, the middle, and the end of period t  T; respectively, as shown in Figure 11.
Derivation of the Optimal Contract
Here, we present an algorithm that will allow us to solve for the optimal contract, given that the project lasts
up to a nite time T . This allows us to dene the continuation function for date T , and then solve for earlier
dates recursively. The properties of the optimal contract in nite time will carry over to an innitely-lived
relationship.16 The algorithm consists of the following three steps.
Terminal Value
First, we note that, after time T , any payments to the borrower are transfers from the lender. Since   rt
for all t, it is weakly e¢ cient to make such payments immediately. Hence the continuation function at the
end of the last period is given by
beT (a
e
T (rT ); rT ) =
8<:  aeT (rT ) for aeT  AT 1 for aeT < AT : (89)
16 In the stationary setting the optimal innite horizon contract can be derived by taking the limit as T !1.
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Given the continuation function (89), we will work backwards to determine recursively continuation function
bet (; rt) for dates t < T: Note that, for aeT (rT )  AT , the continuation function beT (; rT ) is decreasing and
concave (it is a linear function). In what follows we will show inductively that bet (; rt) is concave as well.
Step One: Liquidation Problem
Assume that bet (; rt) is concave (note that the payo¤ function at the end of last period, beT (; rT ); is indeed
concave). At any time t the borrower has reservation value At. Thus prior to the termination decision the
lowest feasible payo¤ for the borrower is equal to At. So bdt (; rt) will be dened for adt (rt)  At. Also note
that because the contract may terminate probabilistically at any t, all payo¤ within convex hull of (Lt; At)
and the payo¤ possibilities dened by bet (; rt) are possible. Consider a line passing by point (Lt; At), which
is tangent to payo¤ possibility frontier given by bet (; rt). Let aLt (rt) be the payo¤ at the point of tangency
of this line. An borrowers payo¤ level adt (rt) 2 [At; aLt (rt)] is achieved by terminating with probability
pt(a
d
t (rt); rt) =
aLt (rt)  adt (rt)
aLt (rt) At
(90)
If the borrowers payo¤ adt is larger than a
L
t (rt) it is optimal to continue with this payo¤, so the probability
of termination is zero in this case.
Note that paying one dollar to an borrower costs lender one dollar. Since bet (; rt) is assumed to be
concave, there will be a threshold level of the borrowers payo¤ a1t (rt), such that cash payments will be used
above this threshold. This threshold point a1t (rt) is the point in which the slope of the continuation function
bet (; rt) is below  1. That implies the following characterization of the payment function
It(a
d
t (rt); rt) = max(a
d
t (rt)  a1t (rt); 0) (91)
Note that as a result of these transformations, as Figure 12 indicates, the continuation payo¤ function has
the following properties
bdt (; rt) is concave with
dbdt (a; rt)
da
  1 (92)
In the nal period, by denition, termination is optimal. In this case we set aLT (rt) =  1: Also because
  rt for all t, it is weakly e¢ cient to make any payments immediately. Thus, a1T (rT ) = AT ; and as a result
we have that pT (adT (rT ); rT ) = 1, IT (a
d
T (rT ); rT ) = a
d
T (rT ) At, and bdT (adT ; rT ) = LT   (adT (rT ) AT ): We
summarize our ndings in the proposition below.
Proposition 11 Given bet (; rt) concave, let
lt(rt) = sup

bet (a; rt)  Lt
a At : a  At

:
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Figure 12: Continuation payo¤ function bdt (; rt):
Then, if lt(rt) >  1; dene :
aLt (rt) = inf

a > 0 :
dbet (a; rt)
da
 lt(rt)

;
a1t (rt) = inf

a > 0 :
dbet (a; rt)
da
  1

:
and then we have that
bdt (a
d
t (rt); rt) =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
bet (a
1
t (rt); rt)  (adt (rt)  a1t (rt)) for adt (rt)  a1t (rt)
bet (a
d
t ; rt) for a
L
t (rt)  adt (rt) < a1t (rt)
bet (a
L
t (rt); rt)  lt(rt)(aLt (rt)  adt (rt)) for At  adt (rt) < aLt (rt)
 1 for adt (rt) < At
;
If lt(rt)   1; the termination of the contract is optimal. In this case, dene aLt (rt) =1, a1t (rt) = At and
bdt (a
d
t (rt); rt) =
8<: Lt   (adt (rt) At) for adt (rt)  At 1 for adt (rt) < At
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Finally, we note that the above implies that bdt (; rt) satises (92).
Proof We construct bdt (; rt) as in Figure 12. First, we consider the termination option (Lt; At). Since
the borrower can always terminate and receive At, payo¤s below this are infeasible: bdt (; rt) =  1 for
a < At: For payo¤s above At, we need to nd the line from (Lt; At) to the curve bet (; rt) with the highest
slope. This highest slope is given by lt(rt).
If lt(rt) >  1 the line with the highest slope connects to bet (; rt) at aLt (rt): Thus, payo¤s adt (rt) 2
[At; a
L
1 (rt)] can be achieved by mixing between the borrowers termination value of At and the minimal
value of continuation with aL1 (rt): The probability of termination, pt(a
d
t (rt); rt), is given by (90) which solves
ptAt + (1  pt)aLt (rt) = adt (rt)
In this case the lendersexpected payo¤ is
pt(a
d
t (rt); rt)Lt + (1  pt(adt (rt); rt))bet (aLt (rt); rt) =
bet (a
L
t (rt); rt) +
aLt (rt)  adt (rt)
aLt (rt) At
(Lt   bet (aLt ; rt)) = bet (aLt (rt); rt)  lt(rt)
 
aLt (rt)  adt (rt)

Since we assumed that lt(rt) >  1, there is a1t (rt)  aLt (rt); such that, above a1t (rt) it is cheaper to
compensate the borrower directly with the payment It(adt (rt); rt) given by (91). In this case an lenders
payo¤ is
bdt (a
d
t (rt); rt) = b
e
t (a
1
t (rt); rt)  It(adt (rt); rt) = bet (a1t (rt); rt)  (adt (rt)  a1t (rt))
In the region

aLt (rt); a
1
t (rt)

, it is e¢ cient not to pay the borrower. Note that for adt (rt)  aLt (rt),
pt(a
d
t (rt); rt) = 0:
Now suppose that lt(rt)   1: In this case paying the borrower at once is cheaper for any payo¤ above
At: Therefore, it is optimal to terminate with probability 1, which corresponds to setting aLt (rt) = 1 in
(90), and lenders payo¤ is
bdt (a
d
t (rt); rt) = Lt   (adt (rt) At)
for adt (rt)  At: The above properties imply that bdt (rt) satises (92).
Step Two: The Intra-Period Agency Problem
In this subsection, we solve for the continuation function, byt (; rt), before the income Yt is realized, given the
continuation function bdt (; rt). To do so, we must make sure that the borrowers is provided with incentives
to reveal its income to the lender. Consider the borrowers problem at the start of period t. After realizing
the cash ow Yt, the borrower must choose a report Y^t to make. Contingent upon report Y^t, according
to the contract, the borrower will receive a continuation payo¤ adt (rt). An optimal contract species the
continuation payo¤ adt as a function of the reported income so as to provide incentives for the borrower
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to report truthfully (that is to choose Y^t = Yt). This must be done in a way that maximizes the lenders
expected payo¤. Formally, this problem is equivalent to the following optimization problem:
byt (a
y
t (rt); rt) = max
adt (rt)At
E[Yt + b
d
t (a
d
t (rt); rt)] s:t:
(IC) : adt (rt; Yt)  adt (rt; Y^t) + (Yt   Y^t) for any Y^t  Yt; bYt 2 Yt
(PK) : E[adt (rt; Yt)] = a
y
t (rt) (93)
The objective function is the expected payo¤ of lender at the beginning of period t. The lender receives
the cash ows and the highest possible continuation payo¤ bdt (; rt) given that the borrower receives adt (rt):
The rst constraint, (IC), is the incentive compatibility constraint for the borrower. It insures that it is
optimal for the borrower to report all its income to the lender, rather than under-report and consume some
of the cash ow himself. The second constraint, (PK), is the promise-keepingconstraint. This constraint
guarantees the borrowers expected continuation payo¤ is consistent with his promised continuation payo¤
ayt (rt) at the beginning of the period t.
To solve (93), we rst note that the (IC) constraint is equivalent to adt (rt; Y ) Y being weakly increasing
in Y . The promise-keeping constraint xes the mean payo¤ to the borrower, so di¤erent choices of adt (rt)
a¤ect its variability. But as bdt (; rt) is concave, it is optimal to minimize the variability of adt (rt; y). This
is done by setting da
d
t (rt;y)
dy = 1, so that the incentive constraints just bind. We summarize this discussion
formally in the proposition below.
Proposition 12 Given bdt (; rt); which satises (92), the optimal continuation payo¤ for the borrower con-
tingent on the reported income Yt is given by
adt (rt; Yt) = a
y
t (rt) + (Yt  t)
This implies that the beginning of period continuation function, bdt , equals
byt (a
y
t (rt); rt) = t + E[b
d
t (a
y
t (rt) + (Yt  t) ; rt)];
and byt (; rt) is concave.
Proof We start by verifying that it is without loss of generality to assume that the borrower reveals its
entire income Yt at the solution. Suppose there is a solution in which the borrower reveals Y 0t  Y^t(rt; Yt)  Yt
and receives adt (rt; Y^t). Consider the new continuation payo¤ a
d
t (rt; Yt) = a
d
t (rt; bYt(rt;Yt)) + Yt   Y^t(rt;Yt).
Given this continuation payo¤, it is easy to see that truthful reporting is optimal, and the borrowers payo¤s
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are unchanged. The change in the lenders payo¤ is
[Yt + b
d
t (a
d
t (rt; Yt); rt)]  [Y^t + bdt (adt (rt; bYt); rt)] =
Yt   bYt + bdt (adt (rt; bYt) + Yt   Y^t(rt; Yt); rt)  bdt (adt (rt; Y^t); rt)  0
where the last inequality follows since db
d
t (a;rt)
da   1:
Note that, given truthful reporting, the (IC) constraint is equivalent to g(Y; rt) = adt (Y; rt)   Y being
weakly increasing in Y . The promise keeping constraint, (PK), then becomes
E[g(Yt; rt)] = a
y
t (rt) t
and the continuation payo¤ at the beginning of period t is
E[Yt + b
d
t (Yt + g(Yt); rt)] = t + E[b
d
t (Yt + g(Yt); rt)]
As the mean of function g(; rt) is xed by (PK), and since bdt is concave, the optimal choice of g(; rt) is
to minimize the variability of Yt + g(Yt; rt) subject to the constraint that g(; rt) is weakly increasing. The
solution of this problem is to make g(; rt) constant and equal to its mean ayt (rt) t. Therefore,we have
that
adt (Y; rt) = a
y
t (rt) + (Y  t)
Finally, we observe that, as the expectation operator is a linear operator, the concavity of bdt (; rt) implies
the concavity of byt (; rt):
We note that the above result implies that, the borrower has no incentive to use private savings, justifying
our solution methodology. As the above proposition shows, the marginal benet to the borrower from
reporting a higher cash ow is constant. As a result, since for any t the borrowers discount rate, , exceeds
the return to private savings, t, there is no benet to hiding cash ows today in order to report higher cash
ows in the future (or increase future consumption).
Lemma 5 Function byt (; rt) satises
dbyt (; rt)
da
  1 (94)
Proof From Proposition 12 we have that byt (a
y
t (rt); rt) = t + E[b
d
t (a
y
t (rt) + (Yt  t); rt)]: This
combined with (92) and the properties of the expectation operator yields (94).
Step Three: Discounting Between the Periods
So far, we have described how to compute the continuation function byt (; rt) at the start of period t given
the continuation function bet (; rt) at the end of period t. In this subsection, we derive the continuation
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function at the end of the prior period, bet 1(; rt 1), and combine our results to complete our recursive
characterization of the optimal contract.
Moving from the start of period t to the end of the prior period, t   1, involves discounting the payo¤s
of the borrower and the lender. To provide the borrower with a payo¤ of a at the end of period t   1,
the borrowers expectation of what he is to be given, at the beginning of period t; must be equal the value
of a plus increase at his subjective rate  less the amount of deterministic utility, t; he derives at the
beginning of period t from home ownership. The lenders continuation payo¤ at the end of time t   1
is the expected continuation payo¤ at time t discounted at rate rt 1. Therefore, given the end of period
continuation value aet 1(rt 1); the lender optimally chooses the beginning of next period continuation values
for the borrower ayt (rt) in order to maximize the expected discounted continuation payo¤ function, subject
to keeping his promises to the borrower. From Proposition 12 we know that adt (rt; Y ) = a
y
t (rt)+ (Y  t):
As adt (rt)  At, it implies that, in choosing ayt (rt), the lender will have to satisfy the following condition
ayt (rt)  At   (Y 0t  t)
Our discussion above implies the following characterization of continuation function bet 1(; rt 1).
Proposition 13 Given byt (; rt); aet 1(rt 1) 2

aLt 1(rt 1); a
1
t 1(rt 1)

; and rt 1; the continuation function
at the end of the prior period, bet 1(a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1); is given by
bet 1(a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1) = max
ayt (a
e
t 1(rt 1);rt 1;rt)At (Y 0t  t)
e rt 1E [byt (a
y
t (rt); rt) jrt 1 ]
subject to
E(ayt (rt) jrt 1 ) = eaet 1(rt 1) t
Proof Immediate from the above discussion.
Lemma 6 The end of period continuation function bet 1(; rt 1) is concave.
Proof From Proposition 13 we know that aet 1(rt 1) 2

aLt 1(rt 1); a
1
t 1(rt 1)

. Let ayt (a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1; rt),
for rt 2 frL; rHg, be the solution to the problem dened in Proposition 8. We consider two cases:
Case 1: Suppose that the solution is interior, that is for rt 2 frL; rHg, we have that
ayt (a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1; rt) > At   (Y 0t  t):
Let rt 1 = ri; where i 2 fL;Hg. Let rt 1 = ri; where i 2 fL;Hg : From the promise keeping constraint
(1  e (ri))ayt (r i) + e (ri)ayt (ri) = eaet 1(ri) t (95)
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we have that
ayt (r i) =
eaet 1(ri) t   e (ri)ayt (ri)
(1  e (ri)) (96)
Using this we can express bet 1(a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1) as
bet 1(a
e
t 1(ri); ri) =
max
ayt (rt)At (Y0 t)
e ri
264 e (ri)byt (ayt (ri); ri)+
(1  e (ri))byt

eaet 1(ri) t e (ri)ayt (ri)
(1 e (ri)) ; r i
 375
subject to
eaet 1(ri) t e (ri)ayt (ri)
(1 e (ri))  At (Y0 t). Suppose that at the optimal choice the appropriate
derivatives exist and so we have that
dbyt (a
y
t (ri); ri)
da
=
dbyt

eaet 1(ri) t e (ri)ayt (ri)
(1 e (ri)) ; r i

da
: (97)
Now we note that
dbet 1(a
e
t 1(ri); ri)
daet 1(ri)
= e (ri+(ri))
dbyt (a
y
t (ri); ri)
da
dayt (ri)
daet 1(ri)
+

e( ri)   e (ri+(ri)) da
y
t (ri)
daet 1(ri)
 dbyt  eaet 1(ri) t e (ri)ayt (ri)(1 e (ri)) ; r i
da
:
Using (97) in the above implies that
dbet 1(a
e
t 1(ri); ri)
daet 1(ri)
= e( ri)
dbyt

eaet 1(ri) t e (ri)ayt (ri)
(1 e (ri)) ; r i

da
:
From the above we have that
d2bet 1(a
e
t 1(ri); ri)
d
 
aet 1(ri)
2 =
e( ri)
d2byt

eaet 1(ri) t e (ri)ayt (ri)
(1 e (ri)) ; r i

da2

e + e (ri)
dayt (ri)
daet 1(ri)

(98)
It follows from the properties of functions byt (; rt); and from (95), that
dayt (ri)
daet 1(ri)
 e

e (ri)
:
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But this combined with the condition (98) and the fact that byt (; rt) is concave implies that
d2bet 1(a
e
t 1(ri); ri)
d
 
aet 1(ri)
2  0
so we conclude that bet 1(a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1) is concave for a
e
t 1(rt 1) and rt 1 such that a
y
t (rt) > At   (Y 0t  
t) for rt 2 frL; rHg if at the optimal choice the appropriate derivatives exist.
If the appropriate derivatives do not exist around the solution then as we increase aet 1(ri) either a
y
t (ri)
or ayt (r i) must increase. Without loss in generality suppose that it is a
y
t (ri) that locally increases. Then
around the solution we will have that
dayt (a
e
t 1(ri); ri; r i)
daet 1(ri)
= 0;
dayt (a
e
t 1(ri); ri; ri)
daet 1(ri)
=
e
e (ri)
:
But then
dbet 1(a
e
t 1(ri); ri)
daet 1(ri)
= e (ri+(ri))
dbyt (a
y
t (a
e
t 1(ri); ri; ri); ri)
da
dayt (a
e
t 1(ri); ri; ri)
daet 1(ri)
= e( ri)
dbyt (a
y
t (a
e
t 1(ri); ri; ri); ri)
da
:
Since ayt (a
e
t 1(ri); ri; ri) increases in a
e
t 1(ri) and
dbyt (;ri)
da decreases in a,
dbet 1(a
e
t 1(ri);ri)
daet 1(ri)
decreases in aet 1(ri).
The same argument can be repeated for the case when it is ayt (r i) that increases with a
e
t 1(ri) around the
solution when the appropriate derivatives do not exist.
But this altogether implies that the value function for the lender is concave in a whenever ayt (a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1; rt) >
At   (Y 0t  t), rt 2 frL; rHg :
Case 2: Suppose that the solution is not interior, that is we have that ayt (rt) = At  (Y 0t   t) for some
rt 2 frL; rHg : First suppose that in the neighborhood of aet 1(ri); ayt (r i) = At   (Y 0t   t): Then we have
that
dayt (ri)
daet 1(ri)
=
e
e (ri)
;
dayt (r i)
daet 1(ri)
= 0:
But then
dbet 1(a
e
t 1(ri); ri)
daet 1(ri)
= e (ri+(ri))
dbyt (a
y
t (ri); ri)
da
dayt (ri)
daet 1(ri)
= e( ri)
dbyt (a
y
t (ri); ri)
da
:
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From the above we have that
d2bet 1(a
e
t 1(ri); ri)
d
 
aet 1(ri)
2 = e( ri) ee (ri) d2byt (ayt (ri); ri)da2  0; (99)
where the last inequality follows from the concavity of function byt (; rt).
If in the neighborhood of aet 1(ri); a
y
t (ri) = At   (Y 0t   t), we have that
dayt (ri)
daet 1(ri)
= 0;
dayt (r i)
daet 1(ri)
=
e
1  e (ri) :
But then
dbet 1(a
e
t 1(ri); ri)
daet 1(ri)
= (1  e (ri))e ri db
y
t (a
y
t (r i); r i)
dayt (r i)
dayt (r i)
daet 1
= e( ri)
dbyt (a
y
t (r i); r i)
dayt (r i)
:
From the above we have that
d2bet 1(a
e
t 1(ri); ri)
d
 
aet 1(ri)
2 = e( ri) e1  e (ri) dbyt (ayt (r i); r i)dayt (r i)  0; (100)
where the last inequality follows from the concavity of function byt (; rt).
The properties (99)-(100) imply that bet 1(a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1) is concave for a
e
t 1 and rt 1 such that a
y
t (rt) =
At   (Y 0t  t) for some rt 2 frL; rHg :
Combining our discussion of Case 1 and Case 2, we conclude that the end of period continuation function
bet 1(; rt 1) is concave.
Starting from the terminal continuation beT dened by (89), the Propositions 11-13 allow us to recursively
solve for the continuation function at all earlier points in the contract. Note that as beT (; rT ) is concave, the
Propositions 11-13, and Lemma 6 imply that functions byt (; rt); bdt (; rt); bet (; rt) are concave for all t  T ,
rt 2 frL; rHg :
The Dynamics of the Optimal Contract
Having solved for the optimal contract recursively, we can now describe the dynamics of the optimal contract.
Let ayt be the optimal function solving the problem of the Proposition 8. Dene
 t(a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1; rt) = a
y
t (a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1; rt)  eaet 1(rt 1) + t
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From the denition of ayt we have that
e (rt 1) t(a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1; rt 1) + (1  e (rt 1)) t(aet 1(rt 1); rt 1; rct 1) = 0;
where we remember that rct 1 = frL; rHg n frt 1g. The above implies that
 t(a
e
t 1(rt 1); rt 1; rt 1) =  (e(rt 1)   1) t(aet 1(rt 1); rt 1; rct 1):
The behavior of the contract is governed by the current promised continuation payo¤ for the borrower. From
our above results, the evolution of this state variable prior to termination can be described as follows:
aet 1(rt 1) !
ayt (rt = rt 1) = e
aet 1(rt 1) t   (e(rt 1)   1) t(aet 1(rt 1); rt 1; rct 1)
ayt (rt = r
c
t 1) = e
aet 1(rt 1) t +  t(aet 1(rt 1); rt 1; rct 1)
ayt (rt) ! adt (rt) = ayt (rt) + (Yt  t);
adt (rt) ! aet (rt) = min(a1t (rt);max(aLt (rt); adt (rt))):
Given the borrowers promised payo¤, the payments to the borrower and the termination probability at each
period t are given by
It(a
d
t (rt); rt) = max(a
d
t (rt)  a1t (rt); 0),
pt(a
d
t (rt); rt) =
max(aLt (rt)  adt (rt); 0)
aLt (rt) At
:
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